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 During the late twentieth century, roughly between the 1970s and the 1990s, 
South Carolina’s textile industry experienced a crisis triggered by growing imports and 
modernization. This crisis led to mass layoffs and plant closures on a scale previously 
unheard-of within the Piedmont South and led to the death and decline of many textile-
dominated towns across the state. This thesis explores this crisis and examines the 
reactions to the textile crisis by textile workers, industry leaders, and local leaders within 
these towns. It examines the actions taken by federal and state government officials to 
counter the causes and effects of the textile crisis. Utilizing correspondence from textile 
workers, government officials, and industry leaders, speeches from state leaders, and 
newspaper articles, this thesis argues that the reaction and action from the parties at play 
in South Carolina’s textile crisis underwent three separate stages between 1975 and 1990 
– from denial to intense activism to disillusionment and silence. This thesis aims to place 
the experience of textile mills and textile-dominated towns into conversation with other 
works of deindustrialization in the United States and refute historiographical claims that 
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 “It was like a death in the family.”1 This sentiment characterizes how many 
workers, local leaders, and townsfolk felt after the closure of textile and apparel mills in 
many rural cities and towns across the South Carolina Piedmont in the 1980s. For many 
workers – whom Jacquelyn Down Hall described as “like a family” – who had been 
millhands for their entire lives, losing their only source of employment was genuinely 
akin to losing someone with whom they had spent more than half their lives. The same 
could be said of mill towns, like Honea Path, Ware Shoals, and Laurens, and textile-
dominated cities like Greenville. The loss of the industry that dug them out of poverty in 
the New South period and brought the cities prosperity was indeed “a death in the 
family.” The textile crisis that befell the industry in the late twentieth century was the 
final blow to this once-dominant industry – leading to the destruction of livelihoods and 
entire towns that once pledged loyalty to the industry. 
Textiles were once the leading force in the South Carolina economy. By the turn 
of the twentieth century, cotton textile mills dominated the newly forming industrial 
landscape of the South Carolina Piedmont. Once the domain of independent farmers, 
tenant farmers, and sharecroppers, this rural landscape had become a collection of 
industrial towns, fueled by a mill-building campaign from small-town boosters in the late 
nineteenth century. Further, by the 1950s, South Carolina’s industry had boomed from a 
 




small collection of mills to become the United States’ largest producer of cotton textiles 
with the textile and apparel industry comprising 37% of the manufacturing workforce in 
South Carolina.2 This dominant textile industry within the state remained centered in its 
traditional base – small, rural cities and towns across the Upstate region of South 
Carolina, often operating out of the same building for upwards of 70 years. 
The end of textile mills and other manufacturing endeavors in the rural Piedmont 
South, which began in the late twentieth century, occurred at a time of transition in the 
economics of the South from the manufacturing that came out of the New South of the 
turn of the 20th century to the high-tech industry, service, and tourism economy that 
emerged in the 1970s and helped create the modern, Sunbelt South. At the time of this 
transition, large cities and economic centers within the South continued to grow and carry 
on despite the departure of their original industrial base. The story was often different, 
however, for the smaller cities and towns in the industrial Piedmont.3  
Due to the industry remaining scattered around the industrialized Piedmont in 
various towns, these textile towns became heavily dominated by the industry. Even by 
the 1970s, a mill often was one of the sole sources of employment for the population. By 
1975, however, three significant issues had begun to chip away at the textile industry – 
primarily imports, lowering tariffs, and economic downturn. Many government officials, 
 
2 Butler Derrick, “Handwritten Speech Notes” (Washington, DC, 1983), Butler Derrick Papers, Box 21, 
South Carolina Political Collections, Ernest F. Hollings Special Collections Library. 
 
3 In this thesis, a large city/town/economic center denotes cities in South Carolina such as Greenville 
(population ~58,000 in 1990) or Columbia (population ~100,000 in 1990) which would dominate the 
markets or serve as transport/distribution hubs for the industry of the smaller, rural towns such as Laurens 
(population ~10,000 in 1990).  
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newspaper editors, and local workers started to decry foreign countries and lament an 
already dying industry while saying they could save it. This change of economic focus 
within the South and the closure of the textile industry in the South in the late twentieth 
century leads to a series of questions regarding the reaction of those directly related to the 
textile industry: How did mill workers react to losing their jobs? How did federal and 
state leaders act on the reactions and rhetoric of the mill workers? Moreover, did workers 
and industry leaders ever believe the industry had died? 
Laurens, South Carolina, a rural city in the upstate of South Carolina wedged 
between two of the largest cities in the state, Greenville and Columbia, provides an ideal 
look into the stagnation and decline of small cities in the rural Piedmont South as it 
housed a variety of industries, namely textiles and glass production, a fair-sized class of 
wealthy industrialists, and a large working class as well. Laurens is one such town that 
quickly industrialized by the turn of the twentieth century and remained dominated by 
only a few industries by the middle of the twentieth century. Incorporated as Laurens 
County in the 1790s, the town was officially chartered in 1845 as Laurensville before 
shortening its name to Laurens in 1873. Primarily dominated by two mills, the Laurens 
Cotton Mill (founded in 1895) and the Watts Cotton Mill (founded in 1902), the city 
expanded with its industry. It claimed a population of 10,298 by 1970, an increase of over 
100% from the turn of the twentieth century.4 Although not the sole source of industry 
within the city by the mid-twentieth century, textiles employed 5,100 within the county 
 
4 Jacobs, William Plumer, ed, The Scrapbook: A Compilation of Historical Facts About Places and Events 
of Laurens County, South Carolina, (South Carolina: Laurens County Historical Society and Laurens 




as a whole – comprising the most significant majority of employment in the town and 
county.5 Laurens, along with other towns, such as Greenwood, Honea Path, Ninety Six, 
and Ware Shoals, provide an excellent backdrop to study the textile crisis’ effects on 
textile-dominated towns and the reaction of local citizens and mill workers themselves.  
This thesis results from having lived in the aftermath of the decline and closure of 
textiles in a once textile-dominated city, Laurens. It attempts to make sense of what the 
millworkers and townsfolk of places like Laurens experienced in their thoughts and 
actions. As a result, this thesis contends that government officials, local leaders, and the 
working classes went through three distinct phases of reaction to an ever-worsening 
textile crisis. First, those in and around the industry ignored that it was in decline until the 
late 1970s, despite the efforts of a few members of Congress attempting to sound the 
alarm. Second, by the early to mid-1980s, the textile industry was in a real crisis, with 
federal, state, and local leaders working hand-in-hand with textile workers and industry 
leaders toward a solution or an alleviation of the crisis. Third, by the late-1980s, textile 
workers had become disillusioned by the efforts and justifications of government officials 
and local leaders, and eventually silence fell upon a textile industry that many non-
verbally acknowledged as dead.  
Utilizing a variety of sources, including correspondence between members of 
Congress and constituents, newspaper articles, and the Congressional Record, this study 
intends to characterize the three significant issues facing the textile industry as it entered 
 
5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1972, Volume III: Area Statistics, Part 2, Nebraska-




the late twentieth century at the national and state level: imports, tariffs, and economic 
recession. Further, through the use of Representatives Butler Derrick, William Jennings 
Bryan Dorn, and others’ correspondence with constituents, political speeches from 
national and state leaders, and newspapers, especially The Laurens County Advertiser, 
this examination looks into the justifications and explanations given by local leaders and 
government officials for the issues leading to the “textile crisis” and reactions to these 
issues by the working classes of Laurens and other textile-dominated towns in South 
Carolina. Together, with this characterization of national and state issues and policy to 
combat them and the examination of reactions on the local level, this thesis posits that 
throughout the decline of the textile industry due to imports, modernization, and other 
causes, those directly related and associated with the textile industry underwent three 
phases of reaction to the crisis. 
The textile industry was central to the Piedmont Southern way of life throughout 
most of the twentieth century; however, scholars have primarily focused on its early 
stages, using the “golden age” of textiles to discuss what it meant to be a mill worker in 
the Piedmont. Scholars since the 1980s have continued largely to neglect the impact of 
the textile industry on its workers, towns, and states in the late-twentieth century. Yet, 
their works shine a light on issues and stances this thesis aims to uncover. In Like a 
Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World (1987), Jacquelyn Dowd Hall and 
her cowriters argue that this industrial society in the rural South gradually grew in 
importance throughout the late-19th to the mid-20th century with millhands and their ideas 
and positions gaining momentum in southern culture, and that mill society was indeed 
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“like a family” for residents of textile mill villages. However, their scope is limited to the 
early twentieth century and focuses on the growth and stability of the textile industry, 
without discussing its decline. Like a Family does provide a basis to study workers by 
characterizing them as essentially a separate social group from management and the 
townsfolk around them.  
The importance of the political activism of mill workers and their reactions to 
federal policy has been studied in the early twentieth century, yet this importance has 
been similarly neglected in the latter part of the twentieth century. Bryant Simon’s A 
Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948, is one of the 
centerpieces of scholarship of the political involvement of mill workers – particularly 
their relationship to those in public office and how they engaged in political activity 
themselves. Simon argues that millworkers often latched onto political figures at the 
national and state whom they felt best served their varied interests regarding race, 
economics, jobs, and more, and that a variety of factors “made it hard for millhands to 
prevail” in their political endeavors.6 This thesis draws on Simon’s ideology and 
argument that millworkers were actively involved politically, that they worked toward 
what they felt were their own best interests, and that due to a variety of factors, they 
found it difficult to find success on their own. However, I push back against Simon’s 
claim that mill workers and their political activity faded in the postwar period, and I 
argue they were still actively involved through the late 1980s.  
 
6 Bryant Simon, The Fabric of Defeat: The Politics of South Carolina Millhands, 1910-1948 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p.8. 
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Similarly, Jack Roper’s The Last Orator for the Millhands: William Jennings 
Bryan Dorn, 1916-2005 draws from Simon’s work and argues that Dorn continued in a 
line of politicians that drew on the support of mill workers. Roper argues that Dorn was 
convinced that the proper legislation could save the textile industry. This thesis feeds off 
this argument and expands it into the late 1970s and 1980s to argue that Dorn’s 
successors expected the same and fueled the political involvement of mill workers into 
the 1980s.  
Few historians have attempted to bridge the gap between the story of the thriving 
textile industry and subsequent narrative of its decline. Nevertheless, Douglas 
Flamming’s Creating the Modern South: Millhands and Managers in Dalton, Georgia, 
1884-1984 studies the economic and social transformation of one mill town in northern 
Georgia. Flamming, one of the first and only historians to study mill workers in the 
postwar era, states briefly at the end of his work that the southern economy was 
undergoing a rapid transformation in the late twentieth century and is one of the first to 
say that the South had its own “rustbelt” decline in the twentieth century.7 Flamming’s 
focus on Dalton, Georgia, however, causes him to argue that industrial decline occurred 
much earlier, in the 1950s and 1960s, which this thesis argues was not representative of 
the actual decline of the textile industry in the Piedmont South. 
Further, regarding deindustrialization, this thesis builds on three major works on 
the closure and decline of certain low-wage industries in the American South over the 
 
7 Douglas Flamming, Creating the Modern South: Millhands and Managers in Dalton, Georgia, 1884-1984 




twentieth century by arguing that textiles fit into the same narrative as other declining 
American industries during the past century. Two of the first scholars to discuss the 
concept of “deindustrialization” in the United States were Barry Bluestone and Bennet 
Harrison in their The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closures, Community 
Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (1982), which argues that world 
competition and shrinking profits led to the beginnings of a decline in traditionally low-
wage industries in America that would only continue. This thesis builds on this argument 
by claiming that South Carolina’s textile industry declined due to these factors in the 
years after the book was published. Furthermore, Jefferson Cowie’s Capital Moves: 
RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (1999), which studies industrial migration 
from the North to the South and then abroad over the twentieth century in search of 
cheaper labor, primarily informs this thesis by arguing that industrial investment in a 
community, as well as the industry’s departure, and set in motion a series of social and 
political changes on the state and local level.  
Timothy Minchin’s Empty Mills: The Fight Against Imports and the Decline of 
the U.S. Textile Industry (2013) provides the first actual economic and political study of 
the decline of textile mills and provides some research on the effects of imports and 
tariffs on the industry between the late 1970s and the 1990s. However, it neglects the 
more personal aspects of the industry’s decline, such as how workers and local leaders 
reacted to this decline, something that this thesis aims to fill the void. This thesis intends 
to fill some of the gaps left in the historiography primarily by examining explanations 
and justifications given for the decline of the textile industry. It also aims to examine 
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reactions to its decline and to explore the impact on the communities, both physical and 
social, in which the industry was dominant. 
This thesis is focused on the ever-changing and complex relationship between the 
textile industry, its workers and leaders, national and state politicians, and local citizens. 
The three chapters presented within focus on three distinct stages in the reaction of the 
parties at play because of their relationships and their actions taken to improve the ailing 
textile industry. Chapter One explores the situation facing the textile industry and textile-
dominated towns in the 1970s as the textile industry began to falter. As politicians, mill 
workers, and townsfolk started to understand and grapple with the possibilities of a 
declining textile industry, although some politicians attempted to preempt the industry’s 
decline, the majority of workers ignored the decline of the industry until the 1980s. 
Chapter Two describes the textile industry’s continued decline swiftly followed by mass 
closures and layoffs. In reaction to these mass closures, mill workers, industry leaders, 
and townsfolk formed a unified interest group to push for textile and trade legislation 
federally and for policies to support the industry at the state level. Chapter Three 
chronicles the continued failure of national leaders to secure legislation to help textiles, 
and it follows state leaders’ success in securing other industries to replace the textile 
industry in the state. Because of these two different conclusions to the textile crisis at the 
national and state level, mill workers and local leaders became disillusioned with the 
efforts of members of Congress and slowly faded into silence, while local leaders 
continued to praise the efforts of state leaders attempting to attract new industries to 
 
 10 
replace textiles. In all, these spoken and unspoken reactions indicate that by 1990, textile 








“WE WILL SOON NOT HAVE A TEXTILE INDUSTRY!”: RISING IMPORTS AND 
EARLY RESPONSES, 1965-1979 
 
“Sometimes I feel that our elected officials do not know, or maybe don’t even 
care what happens to a town or community where the majority of the people depend on 
textiles for their income.”8 Such rhetoric was the feeling of many South Carolinian textile 
workers, industrialists, and townsfolk of textile-dominated towns across the state’s 
Piedmont region by 1975. Thousands of these folks dedicated their entire lives to the 
textile industry. Often, these millhands worked thirty or more years in the industry since 
they were children and built their families in thriving textile towns kept afloat through 
employment and investment from a singular textile mill. These folks had become terrified 
of the consequences of a dying industry they had pledged their entire lives to, and they 
responded in droves to politicians to make sure their voices were heard, often simply 
asking to end this threat to their “family’s security and to [their] community.”9 This 
industry that had dominated South Carolina’s industrial landscape, which led the South 
into the industrial age – now stagnated and faced unprecedented competition which it had 
not foreseen. However, just a decade prior, textile workers, their communities, and their 
 
8 Ken Watson to Rep. Butler Derrick, 15 November 1977, Butler Derrick Papers, Box 7, Folder (Derrick, 
Public, General, 1977, Textiles), South Carolina Political Collections, Ernest F. Hollings Special 
Collections, University of South Carolina. 
 
9 George V. Ashmore to Rep. William J. Bryan Dorn, 12 September 1967, W.J. Bryan Dorn Papers, Box, 
91. Folder Dorn, Topical, 1967-1968, Textiles, Imports (2 of 6) South Carolina Political Collections, Ernest 
F. Hollings Special Collections, University of South Carolina. 
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representatives in Washington continued as they always had – with no concern for 
textiles’ future. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, cotton textile mills dominated the newly 
forming industrial landscape of the South Carolina Piedmont. Once dominated by 
independent farmers, this rural landscape had become a collection of industrial towns, 
fueled by a mill-building campaign from small-town boosters in the late nineteenth 
century. Further, by the 1950s, South Carolina’s industry had boomed from a small 
collection of mills to become the America’s largest cotton textile producer, with the 
textile and apparel industry comprising 37% of the manufacturing workforce in the 
state.10 This dominant textile industry within the state remained centered in its traditional 
base – small, rural towns across the Upstate of South Carolina, often operating out of the 
same building for upwards of 70 years. Due to the industry remaining scattered around 
the industrialized Piedmont in multiple towns, these textile towns became heavily 
dominated by the industry. Often, the textile and apparel industry was one of (if not the 
only) the sole sources of local employment even by the start of the 1970s – providing 
well over 50% of textile jobs in some Piedmont counties.  
Life in these towns, such as Honea Path, Ware Shoals, Laurens, and Clinton, was 
dominated by textiles. This mills provided the primary source of employment in these 
towns and villages and the means for entertainment, religion, shopping, and more for the 
cities they were located in even through the mid-twentieth century. It wasn’t only 
 
10 Butler Derrick, “Handwritten Speech Notes” (Washington, DC, 1983), Butler Derrick Papers, Box 21, 





employees of these mills that depended on the textile payroll. The “filling stations, retail 
stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, banks, loan agencies, doctors, lawyers, and virtually 
every small business” in these communities depended on the patronage of textile 
employees and their paychecks.11 Textiles provided the economic, political, and social 
lifeblood of these towns, and if taken away, it would mean certain doom for everything 
and everyone who depended upon the industry.  
Although seemingly impervious through the 1960s and early 1970s, by 1975, 
three significant issues had begun to chip away at the textile industry – growing imports, 
lowering tariffs, and economic depression. These issues led many government officials, 
newspaper editors, and local workers to decry foreign countries and lament an already 
dying industry while saying they could save it. Together, with this characterization of 
national and state issues and policy to combat them, and the examination of justifications 
and reactions on the local level, it is seen that those government officials, local leaders, 
and the working classes ignored that the industry was clearly in decline far before the 
textile crisis of the 1980s. 
The Revival of “Millhand Politics” 
The textile industry in the South Carolina Piedmont progressively grew and 
became more prosperous over the course of the twentieth century until it became the 
largest sector of not only the state’s manufacturing base but also its economy as a whole. 
According to the U.S. Census of Manufactures, the state’s textile employment grew 
 
11 Wm. Jennings Bryan Dorn, “Textiles Vital to Third Congressional District,” 7 October 1967, W.J. Bryan 
Dorn Papers, Box, 90, Folder Dorn, Topical, 1967-1968, Textiles, General (1 of 3), South Carolina Political 




steadily from around 128,000 in 1958 before reaching its highest-ever number in 1967 
with 359 mills employing 138,600.12 Similarly, the state’s apparel industry reached its 
peak highs in the 1960s, employing 42,600 statewide in 1967, up from ~24,000 a decade 
prior.13 Despite these record employment numbers across the state, several key politicians 
and leaders began catching a whiff of foreign competition. In the 1960s, they started 
sounding an alarm that mostly fell on deaf ears. 
William Jennings Bryan Dorn, a popular Democratic congressman from South 
Carolina’s Third Congressional District, which comprised the far-western corner of the 
state, including the majority of the textile producing areas – minus Greenville and York 
counties, focused heavily on attempting to “save” the textile industry during his terms in 
Congress – even when others were not interested in it.14 Dorn served in Congress from 
1947-1949 before an unsuccessful campaign for the Senate, but returned to the House 
from 1951-1974. Dorn, a self-styled candidate “of the people,” from Greenwood, focused 
primarily on labor issues and populist issues of the time (much like his namesake, 
William Jennings Bryan). Primarily, he spent his time in the House as an advocate for the 
 
12 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1963, Volume II: Industry Statistics, Part 1: Major 
Groups 20-28 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 22-4.; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Census of Manufactures, 1967, Volume II: Industry Statistics, Part 1: Major Groups 20-24 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p.22-3. 
 
13 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1967, Volume II: Industry Statistics, Part 1: Major 
Groups 20-24,  p.22-3; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1963, Volume II: Industry 
Statistics, Part 1: Major Groups 20-28, p. 22-4. 
 




South Carolina textile industry, so much so that Jack Roper argues in his recent 
biography of Dorn that he was the last true “orator for the millhands.”15 
Dorn, a farmer by profession from Greenwood, a significant textile producing 
area of South Carolina, pledged his support to his constituents as their liaison in 
Washington, and he functioned as a populist candidate. Dorn argued that he was one of 
the few politicians in Washington that were “unbossed, unbiased, and uncontrolled” by 
special interest groups or lobbyists; he always spoke that he acted honestly in the best 
interests of his constituents.16 During his tenure in Congress, Dorn claimed he was “just 
plain old Bryan Dorn,” that he was not bought out or controlled by special interest groups 
but that he wanted to “belong to the people” and to “return the government” to the 
people.17 It only follows that he would spend his terms in Congress fighting for the issues 
that he saw as the biggest threats to his constituents, despite a lack of focus from other 
politicians in Washington at the time, starting with his emphasis on the textile industry.  
While in office, Dorn targeted the slowly growing imports of textiles from 
industrializing countries in the Far East, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and the People’s 
Republic of China, to support the interests of his constituents in South Carolina 
(including some in Laurens, despite not being in the Third District) both through 
legislation and his work on committee hearings. Legislation-wise, Dorn introduced two 
 
15 Roper, John Herbert, The Last Orator for the Millhands: William Jennings Bryan Dorn, 1916-2005 
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2019). 
 
16  William Jennings Bryan Dorn, “I am just plain Bryan Dorn” Campaign Speech for Governor in 
Abbeville County, 1978, W.J. Bryan Dorn Papers, William Jennings Bryan Dorn: In His Own Words, 
South Carolina Political Collections, University of South Carolina. 
 
17 Ibid.   
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major bills into the House stating his support for the industry and wishing to protect it 
from imports in the mid-20th century – 85 H.R. 12512 (1958) and 88 H.R. 4528 (1963). 
Introduced in 1958, during the 85th United States Congress, Dorn’s H.R. 12512 was the 
first in a line of many bills over the late twentieth century to tackle the “import question.” 
This bill primarily acted “to extend for 2 years the authority of the President to enter into 
trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930,” and in turn to seek a 
favorable balance of trade for U.S. industry.18 This proposal did not pass the House; 
however, it represented the beginnings of national attempts to “protect” textiles, 
especially by South Carolina representatives whose constituents were heavily involved in 
the industry. Furthermore, by 1963, Dorn also introduced two bills into the House with 
the exact text as 88 H.R. 4528, which sought “to revitalize the cotton growing and cotton 
manufacturing industry and reduce Federal expenditures for price support operations.” 
These bills were another attempt by this “last” supporter of the millhands to protect the 
industry that was so important locally for many in South Carolina, including Laurens. 
Also, Dorn used his influence on the House Committee on Education and Labor, 
and particularly his membership on the Subcommittee on the Impact of Imports and 
Exports on American Employment, to represent his local interests on the national level. 
Most appropriately, Dorn testified in front of this committee in 1967 on the Hearing on 
Impact of Imports on American Industry and Employment. In this hearing, he argued that 
it was not just federal labor regulations (such as shorter work weeks) or management 
 




decisions like the stretch-out) that caused the liquidation of many textile mills. Dorn was 
one of the first to claim that this decline was due to “low-wage foreign imports.”19 He 
argued for protectionism within United States trade policy, which would become a 
battleground over the late-20th century in regards to the textile industry. 
Not only were Congressmen like Dorn arguing for their constituents in 
Washington, but also a few Senators had begun realize that the textile industry in the 
1960s was clearly in decline. However, they were also largely ignored by others in 
Washington and at home. Senator Ernest F. “Fritz” Hollings, Democratic Senator from 
South Carolina, who served between 1966 and 2005 after a stint as Governor, became 
one of the major players in the on-going textile debate. Although he became a proponent 
of protectionism regarding the textile industry by the 1970s, he largely ignored the 
industry’s decline in the early 1960s. However, by 1967, Hollings published a report to 
his constituents entitled “Textile Industry Jobs at Stake,” in which he blasted Lyndon B. 
Johnson administration’s handling of the textile industry. Primarily, he argued that 
although 400,000 lost their jobs in a textile crisis in the 1950s (the beginning of the 
industry’s decline), President John F. Kennedy swiftly fixed the industry’s issues.20 He 
further argued that Johnson treats “the domestic textile industry as expendable” and that a 
 
19 “Impact of Imports and Exports on Employment. Part 4: Textiles,” § House Committee on Education and 
Labor (1961), p. 162.  https://congressional-proquest-
com.libproxy.clemson.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1961-edl-0036?accountid=6167. 
 
20 Ernest F. Hollings, “Textile Jobs at Stake,” Senator Ernest F. Hollings Reports to South Carolina, 1967, 





favorable balance of trade will fix the problems that many have begun to highlight by the 
1970s.21 
Locally during the 1950s and 1960s, Laurens did not experience many issues with 
their textile industry involving closure or economic struggle, even as people nationally 
began to target challenges that would start to conflict with South Carolina’s textile 
industry. Over the early 20th century, Laurens Cotton Mills (and later Laurens Mill) 
continued to grow steadily and merged with Deering Milliken, Inc. (now Milliken and 
Company) in 1968.22 Similarly, J.P. Stevens Company acquired the formerly independent 
Watts Mills (located in the Wattsville Section in the northern part of the city) in 1947, 
and it continued to grow and modernize over the early to mid-twentieth century. This 
modernization was mainly seen in 1966 when it added “44,000 square feet of carding and 
spinning room” and increased employment by 15 percent.23 This growth allowed Watts 
Mills to turn raw material into finished cloth entirely within the plant. This lack of 
concern regarding Laurens’ textile industry was further confirmed by a lack of 
commentary in The Laurens County Advertiser, the local weekly newspaper. A study of 
articles from the Advertiser in 1965, around the time when Dorn and Hollings were 
beginning to discuss the textile industry’s decline nationally, shows next to no 
information about textile struggles locally, except for “mill awards” or the “$3 million 
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expansion” of the Watts Mills plant.24 This lack of discussion within editorials confirms 
that locally, people were blissfully unaware of the challenges and problems that soon 
would strike the textile industry nationally. 
The Beginnings of a “Textile Crisis” 
By the 1970s, however, it was clear to many lawmakers in Washington 
representing the Piedmont South and the textile industry realized that it would be  
necessary to protect their constituents (and for the industry’s interests) due to several 
growing challenges that were causing problems with the industry domestically – mainly 
imports, protective tariffs, and an economic recession during the 1970s. During the first 
half of the decade, leaders mostly were feeling out the issues at hand, and these efforts 
were felt locally in Laurens, as well as carried out by Congressmen such as Dorn, his 
replacement Butler Derrick, as well as those who represented Laurens during a re-
districting to the 5th District in the middle of the 20th century. These Congressmen 
concentrated their efforts on beginning to recognize and combat imports and requesting 
tariffs or tariff exemptions.  
Nationally, Timothy Minchin, in his Empty Mills: The Fight Against Imports and 
the Decline of the U.S. Textile Industry (2013), reports that between the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s, textile imports from “emerging Asian economies” such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Korea, and China, skyrocketed which only exacerbated the issues seen within 
 





the industry during the 1960s.25 This growth in imports prompted many national leaders 
from textile producing states to jump into action and speak out against imports to appease 
the industries who financially supported them and their constituents who voted to keep 
them in office. 
Locally, it was not until 1970 that these issues facing the textile industry were 
raised by residents, and concerns began to rise. An editorial simply titled “Textiles Need 
Help,” from June 17, 1970, within The Laurens County Advertiser raised some brewing 
problems within the county regarding imports. The author made the case that fifty percent 
of Laurens’ industrial payroll was employed in textiles, so that “anything that hurts 
textiles will hurt our economy.”26 In turn, the editor asked all readers to write letters to 
South Carolina Congressmen because if “nothing is done to limit textile imports, then the 
industry” and the local economy “will face some rough times.” Later that same month, 
the Advertiser featured a front-page headline, “From Textile Imports… Laurens’ 
Economy is in Danger,” which built on the earlier editorial, arguing that legislators and 
others in Washington were not doing enough to heed the call to protect the industry. The 
author, reporter Nancy Parks, argued that the cause for alarm came from the fact that the 
“import volume of man-made fibers exceeded” U.S. production for the first time in 1969, 
and ended with a call for action – “should 58% of Laurens County’s economy be allowed 
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to be washed away by a rising tide of imports?”27 The president of Clinton Mills, a 
nearby textile mill in Laurens County, argued that local producers “don’t have the time to 
fight the import situation” with their products.28 
Heeding the call and wave of letters from his constituents and those from Laurens, 
Bryan Dorn, in one of his last actions before leaving Congress to run for Governor, 
introduced yet another bill aimed at curbing imports in 1971, 92 H.R. 9479. This 
measure, one of the first to specifically target imports of textiles from foreign markets 
rather than textiles overall, aimed to “amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to 
increase the rate of duty on certain tops, rovings, and yarns…and on certain woven, 
knitted, or nonwoven fabrics.”29 Although this bill was never brought to a vote and died 
in the House, a tariff bill did occur in an attempt to curb the skyrocketing imports 
temporarily. However, it represents an important step in attempting to curb imports for 
his constituents, followed by his successor, Butler Derrick. 
Locally, this first step at curbing textile imports by Dorn was noticed and 
welcomed by various citizens and leaders of Laurens; however, the concerns of these 
citizens and local leaders were not placated. This continued concern about the state of the 
textile industry within Laurens most actively played out again on the editorial page of the 
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Advertiser, which quarterly throughout 1970 and 1971 brought up discussions of the 
textile industry and its mounting issues, almost as a report to readers. One such editorial, 
entitled “Little Validity,” published in the December 26, 1970 edition of the Advertiser, 
foreshadowed the textile concerns to come when it made the case that residents of 
Laurens should not accept only trade bills from Congress but also push them to 
“negotiate agreements.” 30 This, the editors argued, was the best-case scenario for the 
state’s textile industry. 
Furthermore, the editor, Jim Kluttz, argued again later in 1971 in his editorial that 
there is concrete evidence that the textile industry is now in decline in South Carolina 
(and therefore in Laurens County) following a report that claimed that “textile net 
revenue had declined 28 percent” in South Carolina, and that 4,500 had lost their jobs in 
the industry statewide.31 He then editorialized that “unless something is done to relieve 
this hard-pressed industry from the pressures of textile imports, this decline will 
continue,” and ended with a warning that “help must be forthcoming, and soon.”32 These 
editorials indicated that these local leaders and citizens of Laurens continued to push for 
legislation and any measure to “save” an industry that they finally believed to be at 
death’s door, almost at any moment. However, only two years prior, they had virtually no 
concerns about the industry – and actively praised its expansion and growth within the 
city. 
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Although most of the focus on the problems of the textile industry in the 1970s 
centered on rising import numbers and attempting to impose import quotas or protective 
tariffs, there was also a domestic economic recession occurring under Presidents Gerald 
Ford and Jimmy Carter that played a role in the beginnings of the decline of the textile 
industry as well. Representative Butler Derrick received a select few letters referencing 
“depressed market conditions” and other domestic economic problems that the industry 
faced.33 Furthermore, this economic recession was noticed locally, with articles in the 
Advertiser appearing to have discussed the effect of this recession on the local economy 
and arguing that concern over the textile industry is not helping the already depressed 
economic situation within the state. 
Overall, concern over the textile industry and the challenges it faced increased 
dramatically throughout the first half of the 1970s. Representatives in Washington caught 
on first before the issues became a concern in Laurens and across the state. These leaders 
and citizens focused their concerns on textile imports from the Far East, yet they also 
focused on a domestic economic recession beginning in 1970. Nevertheless, both parties 
only recognized the challenged and said that something needed to be done, rather than 
making formulating plans to solve them. 
The “Import Question” and the Late 1970s 
 
As the 1970s progressed, the rhetoric from citizens of Laurens and other textile 
centers advocated stopping textile imports entirely, which was characteristic of actions 
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taken by South Carolina congressmen – particularly that of Butler Derrick, freshman 
congressman representing the South Carolina Third Congressional District during his first 
term from 1974-1976. Representative Derrick received many letters and requests from 
throughout the state over this term asking him to do anything he could to curb imports. 
One such letter from Baxter Huntley, CEO of textile manufacturing firm Huntley of 
York, asked Derrick if he to “see if something can’t be done about the ever-increasing 
flood of imported knit goods.”34 In response to these letters, Derrick promised very little, 
yet he always claimed his responsibility was to protect “the interests of our business and 
manufacturing” across the state.35 Furthermore, in a letter to a concerned citizen of 
Anderson, SC, Derrick echoed many of the concerns given in the early portion of the 
1970s, writing that he knew that the industry was “threatened by a relaxation of import 
quotas” imposed during the first half of the 20th century and a relaxation of the measures 
taken in the early-1970s.36 Despite these pleas, Derrick and other national and state 
leaders failed to take much action toward the industry nationally. Although he was not 
necessarily enthusiastic about textiles in his freshman term, as mass closures and further 
imports continue to threaten the textile industry during the late-1970s his position shifted. 
By the beginning of the 95th U.S. Congress and Derrick’s second term, many of the 
attitudes that Representative Derrick and Senator Hollings (and other members of 
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Congress of the Piedmont South) dramatically changed to match the growing concern of 
their constituents. Fittingly, these two members of the South Carolina congressional 
delegation began to take the lead on textile issues nationally. 
To illustrate this trend, in 1977, a group of congressmen from textile producing 
areas launched the Informal House Textile Committee, which claimed to be a “bipartisan 
organization…working for a sound United States textile policy” to promote and preserve 
the “fiber-textile apparel industry and the 2.3 million jobs it provides.”37 Within their 
promoted policies, these congressmen asked for an extension of the GATT Multifiber 
Agreement with an added exemption on textile tariffs in the next round of negotiations.38 
The GATT agreements, or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, were agreements 
negotiated among major industrialized nations in hopes of reducing tariffs and barriers on 
trade world-wide – and constituted one of the first targets that proponents of the textile 
industry nationally and locally aimed at as one of the root causes of the industry’s woes. 
Furthermore, many claimed that the ongoing Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the 
late 1970s, if not blocked by U.S. representatives, would result in textile tariffs being 
slashed by 60%, and worried it would result in millions of lost jobs.39 The Informal 
House Textile Committee earmarked China as the first significant enemy of American 
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textiles and claimed China was “the [only] remaining uncontrolled low-wage supplier of 
textiles and apparel to the United States.”40 This trend of identifying nations that posed 
the most significant risk and scapegoating them continued thereafter into later decades of 
the twentieth century – particularly the 1980s. 
These actions and concern by national legislators reflected local constituents and 
textile workers who were inflamed and anxious about the issues that faced an industry so 
critical to their lives. Derrick and other South Carolina congressmen received hundreds of 
letters of support and concern from not only corporations and manufacturers, but also 
workers and local folks. All asked for his help to keep their industry afloat. Many 
explanations were given in the 1970s for why the industry might be dying or what they 
believed could save it; most in the 1970s, though, focused on the impact of imports from 
East Asian nations like China and Japan. Many workers, like Ken Watson of Duncan, 
South Carolina, wrote that they worked for or know people who worked for textile firms 
that were “forced to close one of their plants down, mainly because of textile imports.” 
This full-scale closure described by him was rare for the late 1970s, but his rhetoric was 
indicative of the plight that many workers had begun to face by 1977.41 Watson also 
blamed Washington alongside his anti-Asian import rhetoric, writing that he could not 
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understand why “government officials” would “stand idly by and let materials from other 
countries come in and eliminate [our] jobs.”42  
Some workers simply pleaded for help without explanation. Marvin Jackson, a 
textile worker from Fort Lawn, South Carolina, cautioned lawmakers that “if something 
isn’t done, we will soon not have a textile industry!”43 Some letters came from concerned 
citizens, like John Nash of Spartanburg, who wrote that South Carolinians overall were 
highly concerned about impending tariffs cuts.44 He echoed concerns over East Asian 
imports, writing that “it is a shame that here in the center of the textile industry we cannot 
buy textiles or apparel without seeing the names of Taiwan, Korea, Japan, or Hong 
Kong.”45 Nash also wrote that there was a grave concern for “the generation to follow” 
on whether there would be more significant disturbances within the textile industry for 
the last decades of the twentieth century.46 
By 1978, the rising concerns of textile workers, South Carolinians, and lawmakers 
turned into early actions to again stem the tide of imports and to keep protective tariffs at 
the levels of the early 1970s at the national level. Notably, several resolutions in the 95th 
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Congress, H.R. 856, H.R. 9937, and H.R. 10853, constituted attempts by textile 
proponents at the national level to slow the hemorrhaging and assuage the anxiety of 
textile workers back in South Carolina and elsewhere. House Resolutions 856 and 9937 
consisted of amendments tacked on to other bills regarding economic matters in an 
attempt to request industry-wide exemption from the tariff reductions agreed upon within 
the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations. Both failed however, with H.R. 856 dying in 
committee.47 H.R. 9937 reached the Senate; however, with Fritz Hollings tacking on an 
amendment to “oppose any such resolution” to lower tariffs on “cheap textile imports.”48 
Hollings’ resolution soundly passed the Senate 48-11 and the House 198-29. Yet, it was 
quickly vetoed by President Carter due to pressure from U.S. Trade Representative 
Robert S. Strauss and other advisors.49  
President Carter claimed throughout his presidency that he was “determined to 
assist the beleaguered textile industry,” and was “committed to a healthy and growing 
textile and apparel industry.50 However, Carter vetoed the Hollings Amendment to H.R. 
9937 because he saw that the bill “would not address the real causes of the industries 
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difficulties,” and in return argued that it would lead to retaliation from trading partners 
writing that the loss of other export areas was “too high a price for our Nation to pay.51 
Carter outlined his plan for the textile and apparel industry within his veto press release, 
in which he focused on the continued globalization of the United States economy. He 
wrote that for the 2.5 million textile workers to “survive in their jobs, we must work to 
keep the world economy strong and international trade free” – which communicates that 
he would not consider other bills to limit imports.52 Furthermore, Carter proclaimed that 
“each step that we take must be directed toward the long-term health of this industry and 
the United States economy as a whole,” confirming further his antagonism toward 
supporting one aspect of the economy at the expense of another. 
Despite the short-lived success of Hollings’ amendment, H.R. 10853, also 
referred to as the Holland-Broyland Bill, was introduced in the House of Representatives 
in February of 1978 by Rep. Kenneth Holland (D-SC) of South Carolina’s 5th District and 
representative of Laurens County. Although the bill still ultimately failed, it generated 
more support nationally and locally, and it represented another step from South 
Carolina’s members of Congress to attempt to support their textile constituents directly. 
The bill, a measure to “amend the Trade Act of 1974,” again took aim at imports and 
sought to “exempt textiles and apparel from any tariff reductions” during the GATT 
negotiations, without which Holland wortied would in the textile industry 41,000 jobs 
 






would be lost.53 Holland claimed he “believed in free trade,” however he believed these 
protectionist measures are necessary because “foreign markets have not opened up to 
U.S. goods” like the textile industry wanted them to.54  This free trade will become an 
ever-increasing argument used by proponents of the textile industry, as referenced in a 
letter to Rep. Derrick and President Carter in support of the Hollings amendment, J. Dan 
Winchester of Greenville invoked the free trade argument, writing that the textile 
industry “isn’t against free trade,” but argued that for the textile industry to be 
competitive “all the trade rules [must be] the same.”55 This argument continued to 
reoccur through many of the letters sent to Butler Derrick and other members of 
Congress, effectively arguing that textile proponents are not for free trade after all. 
However, at first, they seemed to be in favor of “equal” protection. 
Although these measures failed to gain traction in Washington, they were still 
representative of the population of South Carolina in the areas that Holland, Derrick, and 
Hollings represented, and were wildly popular amongst constituents, both in the industry 
and with onlookers. Although not directly involved in the Holland-Broyland Bill or other 
measures in the 95th Congress, Butler Derrick received hundreds of letters from textile 
workers, textile manufacturers, and general citizens asking him and pleading with him to 
pledge his support to these bills. For example, in a letter from Eugene Stone, CEO of 
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Greenville-based Stone Manufacturing Company, he pled to Derrick that “imports are 
closing down American businesses” and “taking away the jobs of your constituents;” 
however, Stone conceded that imports are not the only issues at hand – environmental red 
tape, labor regulations, and others are also at play.56 Furthering this, Erskine Lee of 
Beacon Manufacturing asked Derrick to support H.R. 10853 due to a possible loss of 
400,000 jobs because of the increasing trade deficit, and the industry’s most significant 
non-import burden were OSHA regulations.57  
Despite the pleas from those related to the industry and the local support given 
regarding these resolutions, they gained no traction in Washington. The trade 
negotiations went through while giving some concessions to the textile industry. Despite 
vetoing Senator Hollings’ efforts in 1978, President Carter spearheaded his own effort to 
protect the textile and apparel industry. This step taken by the administration provoked 
mixed reactions among South Carolina’s textile community; however, by 1979, most 
believed that it was a step in the right direction. For example, Robert M. Vance, President 
of Clinton Mills in Laurens County, wrote to Derrick that Carter’s actions “serve[d] the 
national interest by helping to restore order to our domestic textile and apparel 
markets.”58 Despite the crisis a year earlier and many criticizing Carter’s position on 
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textiles, these letters of support and thanks indicate that the state’s industry’s desires had 
been placated – at least for the time being – until the crisis re-emerges in the early-1980s. 
Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, particularly the 1960s and the 
1970s, members of Congress, local leaders, and even citizens voiced their concerns 
regarding challenges the textile industry faced in the Piedmont of South Carolina – 
particularly regarding imports, protective tariffs, and economic recession. However, the 
local citizens of Laurens and other textile-dominated towns were not worried about the 
decline or the issues facing the textile industry in the 1960s, while members of Congress 
and others in Washington did little to address the already mounting imports and other 
issues for the industry that appeared well before the mid-twentieth century.  
By the first half of the 1970s, due to skyrocketing import numbers and a 
worsening economic recession under the Ford and Carter administrations, both local and 
national leaders began lamenting the steepening decline of the textile industry while 
simply claiming restricting imports would solve the industry’s issues, or else it would die. 
Despite the small work being done by government leaders to solve some issues with the 
textile industry in the 1960s, the issues were primarily ignored locally until the beginning 
of the import crisis by 1970. In all, it can be seen that the textile industry began its 
decline over the middle of the twentieth century despite some short-term growth. 
Primarily, government officials, local leaders, and the working classes ignored that the 
industry was clearly in decline far before the beginning of the import crisis in the early-





“IT WAS AS IF A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY HAD DIED:” AN INDUSTRY IN 
CRISIS, 1980-1985 
 
 When textile employees and citizens of Ware Shoals, South Carolina, awoke on 
the morning of Sunday, November 4, 1984, no one expected that their lives and their 
town were about to change forever. However, as church ended and the town’s population 
of a little over two thousand filed home, word began to spread that the Riegel Textile 
Corporation was shuttering its flagship plant, the small town’s lifeforce.59 Riegel 
officially blamed the “surge of textile imports for a sharp decline in the company’s output 
and earnings” for its closure.60 However, it left the 900 employees and town’s businesses 
stranded without their community’s economic backbone. The closure left behind loyal 
employees who never “quite believed that someday the mill would leave Ware Shoals all 
together” – the mill that built a textile empire for the Riegel Textile Corporation, despite 
years of small, downsizing layoffs in 1981 and 1982.61 These workers, shocked by the 
decision, acted as “if a member of the family had died” before their grief often turned to 
anger and despair as they watched their income and the town in which they built lives 
disintegrate before them. The Riegel Mill’s closure left behind “severe unemployment, 
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mortgage foreclosures, outmigration, empty stores,” and much, much more in the once-
glorious jewel in the crown for a thriving textile company.62 
Ware Shoals’ story was not unlike the story of so many textile-dominated towns 
within the Piedmont of South Carolina by the mid-1980s. The progression: the closure or 
threatened closure of a textile mill, followed by the crisis within the population, and then 
the collapse of the local economy and town structure. Deborah Lake, a textile worker 
from Ware Shoals, wrote that her community was “left holding the bag” in the form of 
property and businesses that were now virtually worthless in the wake of the Riegel Mill 
leaving the town.63 Representative Bryan Dorn once said that “when the textile industry 
sneezes, main street in South Carolina catches pneumonia” referring to the fact that so 
many of South Carolina’s towns and cities depend on the textile industry.64 This was true 
not just in terms of employment, but also in keeping local businesses afloat. For example, 
in Ware Shoals, when the Riegel mill closed, it wiped out close to sixty percent of the 
town’s businesses and more than fifty percent of property tax revenue generated by the 
mill that provided services to its residents.65  
By the early 1980s, many of the fears that government officials, industry leaders, 
and workers began to have in the late 1970s materialized – leading to an industry-wide 
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crisis that escalated throughout the early 1980s. The economic conditions surrounding the 
textile industry in the 1970s had begun to cripple the already struggling industry by the 
middle of the 1980s, leading to mass layoffs and plant closures across South Carolina and 
the Piedmont South. This crisis, fueled by the conditions of the 1980s, was ascribed to 
growing imports by industry leaders, and it was the result of a modernizing industry.  
These two factors combined with an already struggling industry fueled further 
uncertainty among those in the Piedmont South whose livelihoods were determined by 
the domestic textile industry’s success. By the mid-1980s, industry leaders, workers, and 
townsfolk panicked and mulled over the possibility of the textile industry’s demise – and 
projected their anger, despair, and confusion onto local newspapers and in 
correspondence with their government officials at home and in Washington. Through 
their attempts at convincing their government to rescue the ailing textile and apparel 
industry in South Carolina, these textile employees use various rhetoric in discussing 
their feelings over the industry – including anti-Asian xenophobia, patriotism, and 
personal anguish.  
In their responses, members of Congress and state government officials took two 
separate paths in the early 1980s to assuage the fears of the textile industry while also 
trying to figure out the best path forward to remedy the economic situation developing 
within the state. Federal leaders in Washington continued their fight against imports as 
they did in the late-1970s, to varying levels of success. Simultaneously, state and local 
government officials took another path by mourning the loss of their textile industry 
while actively trying to replace it with new economic opportunities. In all, these two 
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responses by state and federal government officials constituted the action taken to soothe 
and placate the concerns of workers, industry leaders, and townsfolk who sought 
explanation and justification for the steepening decline of their industry.  
A Steepening Decline 
 By the beginning of the 1980s, some aspects of the American economy had begun 
to improve since the late 1970s and the early years of the Jimmy Carter administration, 
but the textile and apparel industries had begun to falter once again. According to the 
United States Census of Manufactures, in 1982 South Carolina had only 113,300 textile 
employees (not including those in apparel) in its manufacturing sector.66  This number 
was down eighteen and a half percent from the state’s textile employment number of 
139,100 in 1977 and twenty percent below the 143,300 textile workers in 1972.67 These 
numbers show that between 1977 and 1982 – and particularly from 1980-1982 – there 
was a steepening decline within the textile industry of South Carolina. This was 
manifested through the mass layoff of mill workers and closures within the ever-
struggling textile manufacturing sector. This precipitous downswing occurred primarily 
because of concerns regarding the impact of imports; however, it also came about due to 
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the modernization and continued automation and mechanization of the industry during 
the first half of the decade.  
 In 1980, national leaders followed much of the same rhetoric as they did in the 
1960s – that of turning a blind eye to the issues they once combatted in the late-1970s 
due to accepting Carter’s textile policy in the short term. The Carter administration’s 
short-term textile policy focused on reviewing existing import agreements and searching 
for potential harmful surges, creating new agreements, and launching a pilot program to 
improve productivity and promote exportation within the domestic textile and apparel 
industry.68 For example, U.S. Representative Butler Derrick, for one, called Carter’s 
agreement with China in September of 1980 “a first step” in the right direction, keeping 
imports from China at the 1977 levels.69 Meanwhile the American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute (ATMI) called Carter’s agreement a “positive development.”70  
This trend of optimism continued again into 1981, with members of Congress 
starting to caution that something might have to be done to maintain the status quo. 
Representative Derrick spoke in October of 1981 that he was “pleased that the textile 
industry appeared to be healthy;” however, he argued that import regulations were still 
needed to “protect American jobs.”71 Derrick also planned to introduce trade legislation 
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to implement a program which sought “to limit the growth rate of imports to the growth 
rate of the domestic market” in an attempt to ‘protect’ South Carolinian textile jobs from 
foreign ‘threats.’72 In the period from 1980 until 1982 there was no legislation on the 
docket in Congress to attempt to control imports; however, South Carolina’s 
congressional delegation worked alongside the Ronald Reagan administration to persuade 
it to continue to protect U.S. interests as they entered into talks to renew the latest 
Multifiber Agreement (asking him to keep imports at the 1979 levels).73 
Despite this relative optimism at the federal level, things were not all that well for 
the South Carolina textile and apparel industry. Between 1980 and 1982, many textile 
plants began shutting down – albeit not at the levels to be seen in the coming years. What 
started in the late-1970s had soon gathered a snowball effect, with more and more layoffs 
and closures as the decade continued. In 1980, ten textile and apparel mills shuttered, 
displacing 2,101 workers, followed by seventeen mills in 1981, and then twenty-two 
closings statewide in 1982.74 If this many mills were closing as early as 1982, why were 
federal officials from the state so late at catching on? 
At the state level, however, leaders had realized the industry’s condition, and by 
1982 the tune from leaders in Columbia was less optimistic than they were at the national 
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level. Governor Richard W. “Dick” Riley, a Democrat from Greenville in office from 
1979 to 1987, led the charge to recognize the challenges that faced South Carolina’s 
textile and apparel industry, and he discussed the steps to be taken during the early 1980s. 
In September 1982, Governor Riley gave a speech outlining his views where he said that 
many South Carolinians had witnessed the plight of the “textile and apparel industry and 
its bitter harvest of high unemployment.” 75 He further passionately argued that “we 
cannot and will not abandon this basic industry, so vital” to the state.76 Riley suggested 
that South Carolina (and the federal government) construct a strategy to rebuild the 
state’s economy after the recession and import crisis of the late 1970s. He argued that this 
strategy should be “committed to the survival and prosperity of our textile industry,” it 
should care “about the worker who has been displaced,” and it should be “determined to 
put those men and women back to work.” 77 Riley’s comments foreshadowed the rhetoric 
that he would later use in regards to the industry. 
In Laurens, between 1980 and 1983, the local textile industry’s situation was 
painted in an even more dire light. The Laurens County Advertiser ran several articles 
about how unemployment in Laurens County continued to increase over 1980, reaching a 
little over thirteen percent by July of that year.78 Job experts in Laurens County attributed 
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this unemployment to “temporary closures” of the garment industry and “cutbacks in the 
textile industry” despite no permanent closures of the industry within the county during 
the year.79  
Furthermore, by March 1981, J.P. Stevens & Co. announced a change in the 
products produced in the Watts Mill in Laurens’ northern section to make the plant “more 
competitive” and make “jobs more stable for its employees” – a response to rising import 
numbers.80 However, this change would result in 275 textile workers permanently losing 
their jobs to ‘save’ the 375 others employed at the mill – the first true local impact of 
rising imports and a hurting industry within Laurens.81 By May of 1981, although down 
from the intense jobless rate of 1980, the county’s unemployment rate still hovered at 9.2 
percent – giving the county the sixteenth highest unemployment rate across forty-six 
counties, and the local officials prepared county residents that “the job picture [would] 
get worse before it [got] better.”82 
After almost two years of increasing unemployment across Laurens, primarily due 
to layoffs in the area’s textile and apparel industry, local leaders and townsfolk finally 
resumed their calls for stricter import controls they previously sought in the late 1970s – 
joining forces with the ATMI in calling for restrictions once more. In a “textile 
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appreciation” banquet held by the Laurens County Chamber of Commerce on October 
20, 1981, W. Ray Shockley, President of the ATMI, argued that “to prevent the loss of 
more jobs…government leaders must renegotiate a stricter agreement with textile 
exporting countries” because “imports are growing faster than the American market.”83 
Shockley further inflamed the crowd and blamed not only foreign low-wage labor for the 
domestic textile industries problems but also the federal government itself. He suggested 
that the federal government did not do enough to stop imports while imposing federal 
regulations in which mills were expected to pay “one out of every five” dollars made by 
the industry to comply, claiming it shrunk the amount of capital these mills have to invest 
in their plants or their workers.84 
In all, during the period leading up to the severe textile crisis of the mid-1980s, 
the federal, state, and local leaders and commonfolk had three different visions of what 
was currently taking place within South Carolina’s textile and apparel industry. The 
cautious optimism of congressmen like Derrick, to the practical solutions advocated by 
state leaders such as Governor Dick Riley, and the rekindling of fear and despair on the 
local level led to a disconnect between the three levels on the current status of the 
industry and also what steps should be taken to fix the challenges. However, by 1984 and 
1985, the textile industry experienced an unrivaled crisis heralded by imports, 
government regulation, economic struggles, and modernization. This crisis would lead to 
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changes in thought, reaction, and strategy played out on the federal, state, and local 
levels.  
The Zenith of the Textile Crisis 
 As the textile industry in South Carolina moved into 1984, an alarm sounded 
within local communities, including Laurens, and among textile industry leaders of the 
need to inform their members of Congress, about the significant issues which the textile 
industry now faced. Butler Derrick, who earlier led the in the House of Representatives, 
began to speak out against what he saw were the textile industry’s ills and described what 
he saw taking place around him. Furthermore, these descriptions were paired with 
reactions from industry leaders and workers themselves and paint a complete picture of 
what South Carolinians thought was going on with their industry. Together, South 
Carolina’s congressmen, industry leaders, and textile workers showed that by 1984, the 
state’s textile and apparel industry faced threats from rising imports, economic woes, and 
modernization. Together, these forces threw the textile industry into a crisis characterized 
by mass layoffs and statewide closures. 
However, as this crisis kicked off in 1984, not everyone was convinced. An 
editorial in the Greenville News-Piedmont claimed that “hysteria” was “growing as well 
as imports.” The author tried to assuage the fears of his readership, many of whom 
worked in textiles, arguing that “the truth is that the American textile industry is growing 
and expanding in spite of imports, not shrinking because of them.”85 The editor argued 
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there was a “Chicken Little” quality to the textile industry reports that were threatened by 
growing imports, and he did not believe the “sky is falling down on the American textile 
industry.”86 This type of criticism was few and far between; however, articles like these 
prompted government officials, industry leaders, and textile workers to push even harder 
to prove their industry was in a full death-spiral.  
Members of Congress, like Butler Derrick of South Carolina, began once again to 
assign the blame for the majority of the textile industry’s issues on the impact of imports 
from foreign countries – particularly the developing countries of East Asia. In a speech 
on the House floor in September of 1984, Derrick noted that in 1979, textile imports 
made up 20.2 percent of the market within the United States, but by 1982, imports within 
the U.S. had grown over fifty percent to 30.6 percent of the total market.87 Derrick further 
argued that this increase in imports was equivalent to 740,000 American textile workers’ 
jobs, and if something were not done, these workers would soon continue to lose their 
jobs due to imports. This trend only continued into 1985, where imports increased 
another 67 percent from the 1982 numbers, which Derrick believed led to a 40 percent 
decrease in the domestic output of cotton textiles.88 Derrick also outlined the two reasons 
he saw being responsible for the import problem as the industry entered the middle of the 
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decade: a “lack of effective action” by the government and “unfair trade practices by 
foreign competitors.” These two reasons would become paramount in the rhetoric and 
actions taken by all parties involved in their attempts to solve the textile crisis as time 
continued.  
At the same time that Derrick and other members of Congress were outlining 
what they saw as the mortal enemy of the textile industry, industry leaders and mill 
workers were bemoaning the continued rise of imports and undertook a campaign to 
make sure their voices and stories were heard. Textile industry leaders primarily focused 
on how imports directly hurt their business. However, they also employed the rhetoric of 
threats – such as from J. Connie Robinson, Vice President of Manufacturing at 
Burlington Industries – who threatened in a letter that if Republicans want the support of 
“the South, and particularly the textile industry,” they should become more interested in 
curbing the import problem and more interested in the “effect[s] it is having on textile 
employment.”89 Others, like W. M. “Mat” Self, Vice President of Greenwood Mills, 
argued that imports, combined with a whole host of “unfair trade practices” such as quota 
violations, exclusion of American imports, and other factors would soon doom the 
domestic textile industry.90 Self also brought back the old argument that the textile 
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industry just sought “free trade” brought about through import controls to compete with 
rising imports.91 
Textile workers, however, took a less combative tone than did their superiors and 
industry leaders, and instead wrote their concerns and showed their despair through the 
pages of their letters. Workers also used various rhetoric to convey their opposition to 
imports, usually discussing how textiles surrounded their entire lives or using anti-Asian 
or xenophobic rhetoric – even if it was simply implied and not open hatred. Letters from 
workers like Ruth Coggins, who wrote that imports were “killing our nation,” placed the 
blame solely on the countries who were importing textiles into the United States.92 She 
and others often argued that countries from East Asia were “sending our nation down the 
drain.” However, most workers focused on how they were simply worried about the 
future and expressed their anguish, worry, and fear to government officials and letters to 
the editor to many local newspapers. This sentiment was summed up by Larry Hensley of 
Greenville, who wrote that he was “worried about [his] future job outlook because of the 
surge of imported textile and apparel products.”93 These fears were soon realized for 
many textile workers across the state.  
 
91 W.M. “Mat” Self, “Speech at the Piedmont Technical College 3rd Annual Textile Awards Lunch,” 
 
92 Ruth Coggins to Rep. Butler Derrick, 9 February 1984, Butler Derrick Papers, Box 24, Folder Derrick, 
Public, General, 1984, Textiles, General (1 of 3), South Carolina Political Collections, University of South 
Carolina.  
  
93 Larry Hensley to Rep. Butler Derrick, 28 September 1984, Butler Derrick Papers, Box 24, Folder 
Derrick, Public, General, 1984, Textiles, General (1 of 3), South Carolina Political Collections, University 




By late 1984 and 1985, fears of the impact of the continued growth of imports had 
become reality in the form of mass layoffs and closures of plants across the Piedmont. In 
a speech on the House floor on jobs and imports, Butler Derrick said that employment 
decreased in South Carolina in ten out of twenty categories of textile manufacturing since 
“July of 1983 when the industry was already severely threatened.”94 He continued that 
the state lost “almost 10,000 jobs in more than thirty textile plants in two years.”95 
Derrick further described the closure and mass layoffs through the example of J.P 
Stevens – the second-largest textile producer in the nation by 1985 – who had closed 
thirteen plants in South Carolina since 1980 and had most recently shuttered the Appleton 
Mill, which would result in 500 people losing their jobs in Anderson County.96 In all, 
Derrick reported that in the first half of 1985 alone, 1,140 textile workers had lost their 
jobs due to the textile industry’s problems in the mid-1980s.  
Similarly, this trend of mass closures and layoffs was seen through the closure of 
the Riegel Textile Corporation’s mill in Ware Shoals. The mill’s closure, prompted by 
the increasing imports and competition from foreign textile producers, led to the 
displacement of 900 textile workers and threw the community into disarray. Former 
employee Deborah Lake argued that not only the workers but “every person in Ware 
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Shoals will be affected by the mill closing.”97 The example of Ware Shoals was also 
representative of the reactions of textile workers who lost their jobs and those who were 
nervous about losing them, who were worried about the possible death of their livelihood, 
the town they lived in, and their plans for the future.  
More locally, this trend of mass layoffs and plant closures which resulted in the 
unemployment of thousands of textile workers was represented by the closure of the 
Laurens Mill by Milliken in 1983. Although it occurred a little before the main thrust of 
the textile crisis in 1984 and 1985, it still represented the reasons for mass layoffs and 
closures and the impact it had on the community. Milliken officials announced on April 
27, 1983, that the plant would close, laying off 180 employees due to the ‘increasing flow 
of imports from the Far East into markets where Laurens Mill fabric products compete.”98 
Following this news , Laurens Mayor Bob Dominick called the closure “like a death in 
the family,” while others argued that the closure of the plant would “hit the community 
like a ton of bricks.”99 The editor of the Advertiser ran an editorial following the breaking 
of the closure news and attempted to comfort the grieving city and workers who had just 
lost their jobs. He wrote “like a family that suffers an untimely death the City of 
Laurens…must pull itself together” and begin “to pick up the pieces” to “bounce back 
from the tragedy and make life better for the survivors.”100 
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“Survivors,” was an excellent descriptor for those who became unemployed or 
barely squeezed past actually getting laid off. It was these “survivors,” both textile 
workers and those who are the leaders of the industry, who began in the mid-1980s to 
petition their government to do something about the flood of imports, mass layoffs, and 
plant closures that were plaguing their industry and ending or threatening their way of 
life. Deborah Lake, a former textile worker, laid off from the Riegel Plant in Ware Shoals 
in 1984, summed up the feelings of the workers and leaders of South Carolina’s textile 
industry when she wrote to Butler Derrick in the wake of the plant closure that “it’s okay 
to complain about imports, but it’s not okay to let those complaints be the only thing 
that’s done to prevent plant closures.”101 Moreover, starting in 1985, federal and state 
officials attempted two different strategies to respond to the crisis raging within the 
textile and apparel industry. 
Crisis Management and Reaction 
 As reactions from textile workers, industry leaders, and concerned citizens piled 
onto the desks of members of Congress, senators, and state government officials, these 
leaders began to put in motion a series of bills, plans, campaigns, and rhetoric to allay the 
fears of the textile industry and comprised their attempts to “save” the already dying 
industry. Federal and state officials took two separate paths in an attempt to mitigate the 
problems facing the industry and the state’s economy while alleviating the fears of textile 
workers and towns. Members of Congress, like Representative Butler Derrick, and 
Senators Fritz Hollings and Strom Thurmond, sought to confront the import issues head-
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on in the early stages of the crisis through bills attempting to diminish textile imports and 
dilute their effects and the creation of a campaign aimed to support domestic textiles. 
However, state officials, primarily Governor Dick Riley, now in the final years of his 
governorship, took a different approach focusing on economic development and 
appreciation campaigns instead of attacking imports. Altogether, these different strategies 
focused on a common goal, mitigating the impact of the textile crisis on workers and 
towns beginning to struggle with the consequences of their dying industry. In turn, these 
workers reacted in various ways, both positively and negatively, toward the efforts being 
made by their government.  
 By 1983, President Reagan had implemented a plan for the nation’s textile 
industry, similarly to how Carter, Ford, and Johnson had earlier responded. Reagan’s 
textile plan entailed utilizing new criteria “for addressing import increases,” and if the 
criteria were met, it would establish “a presumption of market disruption” that the 
Administration would then address.102 These criteria were two-fold, one being if imports 
grew more than 30 percent in a single year or if imports from one individual supplier 
equaled one or more percent of the total U.S. production of the product. However, 
members of Congress from textile-producing states and industry leaders contended that 
Reagan’s policy did not go far enough to protect the domestic industry. Instead, they 
introduced legislation to create a policy that they felt better represented the industry’s 
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interests. Despite these efforts, Reagan continued to support this policy, foreshadowing 
the battles to come between textile-producing states and the Reagan administration.  
 Textile industry leaders and federal government officials first began their efforts 
by calling for the re-introduction of “free trade” in the context of textile imports. Many of 
these officials called for the trade to be “fair and equal,” but that for fair and equal trade 
to happen, there needed to be regulations that shifted the balance back to favor the United 
States. For example, the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers put out a 
statement in which they supported laws and regulations that were equal between all 
textile countries, advocated reform to the current trade agreements to make them “less 
complex, less expensive, and less arbitrary,” and finally asked for better enforcement of 
trade law overseas to provide for “equitable competition.”103 Furthermore, “Mat” Self, 
Vice President of Greenwood Mills, argued that the textile could “compete with anyone” 
if the trade was made free and fair and made claims that East Asian nations manufacture 
under illegal conditions.104  
 The first attempt by Butler Derrick and other members of Congress to introduce 
legislation to assist the textile industry was a program designed to mandate that textile 
goods produced domestically should be labeled as such. The program was designed as a 
way to “win some quick relief for textiles overrun by imports” without attempting to pass 
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a sweeping import reform bill.105 By the end of 1984, a textile-focused amendment was 
tacked onto the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. It 
passed the House unanimously 362-0 en route to the bill being signed into law by 
President Reagan in September.106 Derrick and fellow congressman Carroll Campbell (R-
SC) co-sponsored this labeling measure requiring all textile goods to “carry a label 
conspicuously identifying” where it was produced.107 Derrick promoted the decision, 
holding that this would help save textile jobs because “the conscientious American will 
get in the habit of looking for [and buying] items made in the U.S.A.”108 The bill was 
then coupled alongside a marketing campaign designed to promote products that were 
“Crafted with Pride in the U.S.A,” all in an attempt to “boost the sale of our own textile 
products: to blunt the impact that foreign made product, particularly from the Far East, 
are having over here” as the editor of the Advertiser put it.109 The textile labeling law and 
the “Made in the U.S.A.” marketing campaign were hailed as a success and a victory that 
came few and far between for the textile leaders and mill workers alike, and it was 
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considered to be “the most significant piece of textile legislation to become law in recent 
memory.”110 
Following their success with the labeling campaign, federal government leaders 
then attempted another go at passing a sweeping textile trade bill to fix the industry’s 
challenges in 1985. 99 H.R. 1562, also known as the Textile and Apparel Trade 
Enforcement Act of 1985, was introduced into the House in March of 1985 and co-
sponsored by 291 members of Congress, including all of South Carolina’s congressional 
delegation.111 Butler Derrick, one of the original co-sponsors and one of the most 
outspoken proponents of the bill, wrote that this proposal was an attempt to stop “free 
trade and a strong dollar from destroy[ing] our economy.”112 He continued that there “are 
no free trading partners anymore,” creating a “threat to the long-term viability of our 
domestic industries, particularly the textile and apparel industry.”113 This bill was one of 
the first significant attempts to pass a sweeping import quota and trade control bill since 
the short-lived Holland-Broyland Bill almost a decade earlier, and it was justified through 
the fair versus free trade argument employed by many of the industry’s leaders.  
 The Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985 sought to protect the 
domestic textile and apparel industry from growing imports by reworking the Multifiber 
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Agreements currently in place in a way that experts believed would best suit the interests 
of the industry. Primarily, the trade bill provided for a two-fold approach to handling the 
import segment of the textile crisis. First, the bill would categorize exporting countries 
into three categories: major producing countries (10% or more of imports into the United 
States), producing countries (1.25% or more of imports to the U.S), and all other 
countries – with the exclusion of Canada and the European Economic Community.114 
Then, based on that categorization, it would limit or rollback imports from these 
countries, namely Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong would get rollbacks of 30%, while all 
other producing countries would be limited to the quotas agreed upon in the 1984 round 
of Multifiber Agreements.115 In all, this trade bill was written to target the imports from 
developing East Asian nations that had received the blame again and again over the mid-
twentieth century for the domestic textile and apparel industry’s challenges. 
 The bill passed the House and Senate primarily along the textile support lines – 
textile-producing and other traditional industry bases supporting the bill, while most 
Republicans and those from non-textile areas not supporting it. However, when it reached 
President Reagan’s desk, it was quickly vetoed and returned to the House. Secretary of 
Commerce Malcolm Baldridge wrote Butler Derrick explaining why the Administration 
could not and would never support the legislation, believing the bill would “have a 
negative effect on the domestic economy and violate the United States’ multilateral and 
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bilateral agreements.”116 Baldridge also noted that the Administration would continue to 
work within the policy set by the President in 1983 and work on a case-by-case basis.117 
Following this response, Derrick and the other 291 co-sponsors on the bill set out on a 
veto override, which failed to reach the needed two-thirds majority.  
 In terms of reactions from industry leaders, mill workers, and residents of textile 
towns, the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985 generated support from 
across the state like never seen before for any previously introduced measure. Textile 
workers and management joined local officials to craft letter-writing campaigns and 
circulated petitions to members of Congress and notably President Reagan to tell their 
stories and urge federal officials to pledge their support for the trade bill. For example, 
the 2,100 employees of Mayfair Mills in Acadia wrote over 3,400 letters encouraging the 
President to “urge his support for fair trade and encourage him to sign this important 
textile legislation.”118 
 Butler Derrick himself received thousands of letters from textile workers 
regarding the pending legislation, sharing their connection to the textile industry while 
expressing various feelings regarding the industry’s fate ranging from appreciation and 
thanks to despair and hopelessness to even optimism. Again as in the 1970s, through their 
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letters of emotion, textile workers still relied on underlying rhetoric in their attempts to 
convince or thank leaders for their support – primarily focusing on patriotism, the 
American Dream, xenophobia, or the fact that they had no formal training or education. 
One textile worker of Honea Path invoked xenophobia and patriotism when he wrote that 
he was “a working American” in the textile industry worried about losing his job and 
asked Derrick, “why does our federal government find it more important that people in 
other countries have jobs when they take ours?”119 Another worker thanked Derrick for 
his support of the trade bill and used discussions of the American Dream to justify the 
bill, asking Congress to “give Middle Class America our self-respect back, let us keep 
our homes and jobs.”120 Most focused on how long they were textile workers, like one 
textile worker who wrote that he had been working in textiles for nineteen years and had 
no “other training or education and would find it difficult to change” jobs.121 
However, despite the underlying messaging within many of the letters composed 
by textile workers, all of the thousands of letters received by Derrick and other federal 
leaders had an underlying tone of gratitude even in the depths of their despair. Although 
many wrote about how they were terrified of not finding a new job due to lack of formal 
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training, they were ultimately thankful for the help. Also, for the first time in a long time, 
these textile workers felt heard by those in power. Everyone who wrote a letter believed 
their voice mattered, from elderly workers who devoted their lives to the textile industry 
to young children. For example, Joanne Brown of Calhoun Falls wrote to Derrick that her 
husband worked in the textile industry for thirty-five years and is “very glad [he] 
support[s] this bill” because they would find it hard to make a living without it.122 Others 
provided more personal stories to justify why they needed support or what they would 
like to see done in Congress, like Glenda Armstrong of Clover, SC, who wrote that she 
always made sure to purchase goods bearing the tag of “Crafted With Pride in America,” 
and told Derrick that “we must curtail imports in order for our industry to survive” before 
thanking him for his support of textiles in South Carolina.123 Overall, textile workers’ 
reactions regarding the work federal leaders were doing to save the textile industry were 
positive, and they used their platform to share their ideas and worldview with their 
leaders.  
South Carolina’s government officials took a different approach from that of 
members of Congress in their plans to handle the textile crisis. Primarily, state leaders 
such as Governor Richard “Dick” Riley focused on working solutions that were easily 
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within the grasp and the power of the state, such as textile appreciation weeks and the 
beginnings of an economic development focus in Columbia.  
In the early 1980s, state officials and local leaders began designating one week a 
year as “Textile Week” in South Carolina, dedicated to remembering and celebrating the 
textile industry’s importance and thanking textile workers for their hard work amid the 
textile crisis. These were primarily acted upon at the local level and became celebratory 
and meaningful weeks within many textile-dominated communities. Locally, in Laurens, 
Textile Week became a jam-packed event-filled week with mills having open houses for 
tours, five-kilometer road races, banquets, luncheons, and sales in stores.124 Statewide, all 
Textile Weeks usually culminated in the Clemson-North Carolina State football game 
dubbed the “Textile Bowl” due to the importance of the industry within each school.125  
However, local and state leaders wanted to make sure the public remembered that 
the events of Textile Week were to honor those who worked in the industry, not just a 
time to have fun. The Advertiser ran editorials during Textile Week to make sure 
residents understood that “Textile Week should be of paramount importance not just to 
those who work in the mills, but to all those who call themselves good Laurens County 
citizens.”126 To local leaders and local citizens, Textile Week was “the perfect time to 
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recognize how much we need the textile industry” and “to take action to show that we 
can be of help to that same industry during its perilous times.”127 
Starting in the mid-1980s, state leaders, particularly Governor Riley, began to 
shift focus away from the ills of the textile industry and began to supplant hostile rhetoric 
with a focus on economic development to replace closing mills rather than saving them. 
Many of Riley’s speeches after 1983, for example, focused on economic development to 
help those whose mills were closing – rather than focusing on how the state should help 
fight the challenges the industry faced. In a speech to the Textile Manufacturer 
Association Board, Riley discussed the importance of economic development across the 
state, wanting “to make sure South Carolina’s economy (and people) is well-prepared to 
fully respond” to the uncertain times the textile industry faced.128 Furthermore, Riley 
argued that the “need for good economic development has never seemed so important” in 
the challenging times of the textile crisis and outlined new initiatives to jump-start 
economic development in the state, such as the South Carolina Research Authority or 
better investment in education for future industry leaders.129 This focus on economic 
development as a solution to the state’s economic woes and the plight of displaced textile 
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Throughout the first half of the 1980s, the textile industry experienced renewed 
crisis and uncertainty due to climbing imports and a lack of action in the 1970s that 
culminated in a full-on textile crisis beginning in the mid-1980s. Characterized by mass 
layoffs and mill closures on a scale never experienced before, federal and state leaders 
took different approaches to assuage the dying industry’s concerns. Members of Congress 
attempted to attack the import situation head-on through trade legislation, while state 
leaders attempted recognition campaigns and economic development to heal their broken 
economies. All in all, textile workers responded to each and came out of the woodwork to 
support their struggling industry and promote it to the rest of the nation as something 
worth fighting for. However, national leaders’ failure to secure a trade deal led to a 
continuation of the textile crisis into the late-1980s, with more consequences for the 





“WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?”: CRISIS, DISILLUSIONMENT, AND 
SILENCE, 1986-1990 
 
 “We are asking for a chance to survive,” declared mill worker Becky Timms of 
Ninety Six in the aftermath of the failure of the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement 
Act of 1985, “Nothing More. Nothing Less.”130 While her response could be considered 
typical of the textile workers’ response during the height of the textile crisis, her no-
nonsense, authoritative tone differentiates her and others’ correspondence and feelings 
toward the actions of federal and state leaders’ actions following the failure of multiple 
trade enforcement measures in the mid-1980s. Others, like worker Doug Johnson, of 
Starr, took an even more aggressive tone in telling Congressman Butler Derrick, “you 
dumb asses need help if you are still falling for” what he called the lies and deceit of 
industry leaders, and argued they and the government had no concern for the welfare of 
the textile workers themselves.131 Others, like local leaders and state officials, tried to 
stay optimistic, with outlets like the Laurens County Advertiser attempting to promote 
“some good news.”132 Nevertheless, their optimistic rhetoric slowly faded into radio 
static. 
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 What had been a unified front of workers, industry leaders, and local leaders 
working together to push the federal and state governments to support South Carolina’s 
textile industry had become a disunited and fragmented group. In the state’s textile-
dominated towns and cities, blind support from textile workers transformed almost 
overnight to disillusionment with federal and state leaders’ attempts to save the industry  
between 1985 and 1987. Their disillusionment and outspoken nature soon faded into 
silence by the end of the 1980s – with workers, industry leaders, and local officials barely 
mentioning textiles or updates to the challenges the industry faced by the 1990s.  
 Starting with the attempted veto override of the Textile and Trade Apparel Act of 
1985 in the early stages of 1986, the textile-friendly members of Congress began several 
campaigns across the latter half of the 1980s in the same manner as they had in 1984 and 
1986. These officials undertook these campaigns due to the overwhelming amount of 
support they received from the textile industry in 1985 and believed they would receive 
the same support this time. These campaigns constituted attempts to pass trade legislation 
amid continued mill closures and layoffs statewide, as well as increasing imports from 
East Asian nations, which they continued to see as threatening to the domestic textile 
industry. Meanwhile, state officials continued with the same tactics they employed in the 
early-1980s, using textile appreciation weeks and a stronger focus on economic 
development within the state – to varying levels of success.  
 Despite these efforts by national and state leaders, the support of the once-unified 
textile interest group seen in the first half of the 1980s began to fracture and wane across 
1986 and 1987. Textile workers, disillusioned by the 1985 textile trade bill’s failure, 
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became brusque and disenchanted with the efforts of members of Congress and other 
federal leaders. Meanwhile, industry leaders continued to support the efforts of members 
of Congress while often condemning the actions of state leaders whom they thought had 
“abandoned” the textile industry in their time of need. From 1986-1987, local leaders in 
Laurens (and other towns) attempted to sit the fence, trying to appease their textile 
workers and the industry leaders and praising state leaders’ efforts to bring new industry 
into the county.  
 Due to the continued failure of federal leaders to secure the passage of a trade bill 
for the textile industry by 1988, the disillusionment of the textile interest groups turned to 
silence. No workers, industry leaders, or local leaders discussed their industry, its 
challenges, or asked for help to save their jobs as they had done a decade prior.  
There is no direct acknowledgment, speech, or rhetoric from current and former 
millhands, industry leaders, or other parties that they believed the South Carolina textile 
industry could no longer be saved in the late 1980s. However, shifting modes of 
employment, rhetoric regarding former mill buildings, and a growing focus on economic 
development amidst the silence on the textile industry within Laurens and other Piedmont 
towns declared otherwise. By 1990, the textile crisis that ravaged the state’s traditional 
(and first) manufacturing industry had evolved from a true crisis for the state’s economy 
to the status quo. 
The Veto Override Failure 
 Over the latter half of the 1980s, the textile industry continued in the downward 
spiral it had started in 1984, with employment especially plummeting by the late 1980s. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, textile employment by 1982 had dropped to 
113,300 – down 20 percent from the early 1970s. Five years later, textile employment in 
the state was down another 12.7 percent to only 98,900 textile workers within the state, 
and all in all, the state had lost over 30 percent of its textile workforce between 1972 and 
1987. This crisis, which had roots stretching back for nearly a decade prior, had begun to 
drive the nail in the coffin of the state’s textile and apparel industry, and the on-going 
crisis was still attributed to growing import numbers by the late-1980s. By 1986, South 
Carolina’s textile industry was continuing to experience the challenges as it had earlier, 
despite the efforts of national lawmakers who were largely unsuccessful – particularly the 
attempted veto override of the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement Act of 1985.  
 Following President Reagan’s veto of the Textile and Apparel Trade Enforcement 
Act, South Carolina’s congressional delegation joined other members of Congress, and 
attempted a veto override. These textile proponents believed they could garner enough 
support for the two-thirds majority necessary to preempt Reagan’s case-by-case free-
market textile policy. Congressman Butler Derrick thought the veto override was totally  
necessary, as he believed this bill, in particular, would “stop the basic erosion of the 
textile industry” through its provisions to “take action against specific causes of unfair 
trade” – or imports.133  
By 1986, many within the industry and those who lived in and near the South 
Carolina Piedmont’s textile industry began to view the veto override of the Textile and 
 
133 Mike Petrovsky, “President’s Veto Hits Home,” The Seneca Journal (Seneca, SC), 9 June 1986, Butler 
Derrick Papers, Box 90, Folder Derrick, Clippings, 1986, Textiles, Jan-May, South Carolina Political 




Apparel Trade Enforcement Act as a last-ditch effort to preserve the industry. Local 
leaders in Laurens and many other textile towns saw the veto override as do-or-die for the 
textile industry. The editor of the Advertiser declared that “success means that the textile 
industry in America will get a fighting chance to survive,” while “failure means that the 
floodgates of foreign-made goods will swing open even wider.”134 Many considered the 
bill and veto override  the “only option left” for the textile industry – which had struggled 
throughout the early 1980s.135  
Textile workers themselves remained active in their letter-writing campaigns as 
they had for the earlier iteration of the bill, yet, nowhere near the numbers as they had 
written in 1985. Textile workers’ reaction and support for the override followed a similar 
form, yet with more of a tinge of desperation. One worker, writing before the override 
vote, believed that “it is almost as bad as the 1929 Depression we had” in the towns and 
cities devastated by textile mill closures.136 Others, like Marion Argo of Abbeville, wrote 
that “you could not imagine the depression and feeling of hopelessness that gripped the 
people” and pleading that “Congress must now take control of the trade problem” by 
overriding Reagan’s veto.137 
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On the eve of the override vote in August of 1986, textile proponents were 
confident but unsure of what the results would hold. Butler Derrick believed he had 
“people who did not initially support the bill thinking” about supporting it.138 
Furthermore, the editor of the Laurens County Advertiser wrote that “well-reasoned 
persuasion” seemed to be working, arguing that the override “looked to be a real 
possibility.”139 However, when it came to a vote in early August, the veto override failed 
to obtain the two-thirds majority by a slim margin of only eight votes, 276-149.140 The 
most significant attempt to assist the textile industry to date had failed, not only once but 
twice. 
Workers and local citizens were shocked, and despite the previous failures, they 
had gotten their hopes up once again that the federal government would rescue them from 
their crisis only, in their view, to be let down and failed again. Mark Lyday, a junior-high 
school student in Easley, echoed the sentiments of the entire industry when he questioned 
Butler Derrick, “where do we go from here?” and “What happens next for the textile 
industry?”141 The editor of the Advertiser put it best that “close [in getting the override] is 
also good in breaking hearts,” and that just when textile workers thought help was 
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forthcoming, “the rug was pulled out from under them.” Chris Weston of The Greenville 
News reported that following the override’s failure, industry leaders promised to continue 
the fight against imports and push for trade legislation from Washington throughout the 
decade “as long as American textile communities are being dismantled by unfair 
imports.”142 However, those same communities of workers and local citizens started 
becoming more and more disillusioned by the continually failed efforts of federal leaders 
in the 1980s, being particularly true following the Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987.  
Foundering Assistance and Disillusionment 
Throughout 1986 and 1987, national and state leaders continued with the same 
policies they had done earlier in the decade and continued to diverge in their economic 
policy and political rhetoric regarding the state’s textile industry. Federal leaders 
continued their attempts to pass sweeping trade bills to cut the imports they saw as 
damaging the textile industry. In contrast, their state counterparts continued to support 
economic development within the state and “appreciate” the dying textile industry. 
Despite these efforts, textile workers and industry leaders’ reactions sharply diverged. 
Millhands became more and more disillusioned with repeated failures by federal leaders 
while industry leaders were becoming more and more disillusioned with state leaders by 
1988. 
Picking up with members of Congress and other federal leaders in the Textile 
Caucus in 1987, Derrick, Fritz Hollings (D-SC) and others attempted yet another 
sweeping, omnibus trade bill for the textile industry. The proposed Textile and Apparel 
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Trade Act of 1987, which took a similar tone and form as the bill only two years prior. 
Still, it was yet another attempt by textile-friendly members of Congress to slow the 
ongoing hemorrhaging from imports. Derrick and others claimed that this bill, modeled 
after the previous one, was scaled down in an attempt to “resolve the complaints that cost 
them victory” in 1985 and 1986.143 Most congressmen, like Derrick, believed that the 
compromise bill was the best way to get restrictions passed, while senators, like Hollings, 
felt “we ought to be singing the same song,” and making changes could scare off 
supporters.144 Derrick proclaimed that this bill was “far more generous to our trading 
partners than past legislation.”145 Yet, he argued that it was necessary to provide an 
“effective remedy to the import problem.”146 In the end, the compromise bill landed on 
the House floor in early 1987, attempting to do what its predecessor could not. 
This newest piece of legislation simplified and significantly slimmed down the 
provisions of the previous one to answer the criticisms of the 1985 proposal in order to 
gain further support from those previously against it and sway President Reagan from 
another veto. Derrick argued that this simplified compromise bill was the direct result of 
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three criticisms to the previous bill that the Textile Caucus tried to remedy: first, that the 
last bill was anti-Asian; second, that the Reagan Administration “did not have the 
flexibility” to carry out foreign policy, and third, that “it would invite retaliation.”147 The 
Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987 acted upon two significant provisions: one, that it 
would install a global quota of no greater than one percent higher than 1986 import levels 
and would grow by that one percent every year (rather than targeting individual nations), 
and two, there would be no rollback of trade or imports.148 Derrick argued that this bill 
addressed the above concerns twofold – through global quotas rather than targeting 
specific nations, and “since there is no rollback of trade,” there should be no retaliation 
from trading partners.149 
Amid the discussion and battle over the Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987, 
industry leaders and textile operatives expressed divergent views over their feelings 
toward federal leaders’ efforts. Mill workers became more disillusioned and discouraged 
with national leaders, while industry leaders continued their support. Throughout 1987, 
members of Congress, especially the South Carolina delegation, received hundreds of 
negative letters from mill workers expressing their discontent and irritation toward the 
trade bill and pent-up frustration and disappointment from the previous failures in 1985 
and across the late 1970s. Many workers focused their displeasure on the idea that these 
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textile legislation attempts and losses were starting to hurt workers, those who depend on 
the textile industry, and other local citizens more than help. For example, the owner of a 
womens’ boutique in Georgia wrote to Derrick in frustration, saying that this bill would 
hurt “the ‘little man’ and [have] no effect on the big and powerful.”150 Similarly, a textile 
worker felt that this legislation would not help “anyone other than [the] Millikens, 
Stevenses,  and their cohorts” – not the workers that federal officials claimed to be 
protecting.151 
While not lambasting the efforts of federal leaders outright, other workers took a 
more exasperated tone when communicating with members of Congress regarding the 
Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987. Often through these terse letters of support, 
workers implied that they were on their last straw with the federal government. One 
textile worker of Ninety Six wrote to Representative Derrick seemingly exasperated that 
using lofty terms such as “protectionism” and “free trade” to try to solve the industry’s 
ills was “wearing pretty thin with Americans who stand to lose their jobs.”152 She and 
many other textile workers across the state asked for “a chance to survive,” and wrote 
that they did not want any bombastic claims – anything that was “political” or something 
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that was “only important…for reelection.”153 Simultaneously, silence from many workers 
who may have written to plead with the government in 1985 indicates that many workers 
no longer believed the federal government could save them. 
By the time the bill came to a vote in Congress, it had garnered much of the same 
support as the previous bill, and again the vote was mainly along party lines. With 
President Reagan making it very clear that he would “veto any bill that established import 
quotas” that he saw was “protectionist,” the bill passed the House of Representatives 263 
to 156, twenty-seven votes away from the two-thirds majority needed in case of an 
override.154 The Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987 was then passed onto the Senate 
as S. 2662 in September of the same year before being vetoed by Reagan in 1988.155 
Butler Derrick did report that “Congress was not willing to override President Reagan’s 
veto of the textile bill on October 4.”156 Derrick vowed that he would “not cease in his 
efforts to bring some fairness to this trade problem,” and expressed his “total 
commitment to the fight for the textile industry.”157 Despite his zeal, there was a distinct 
lack of coverage of the bill’s veto and override process in local newspapers at the time, as 
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well as a lack of discussion among textile workers, industry leaders, and federal officials 
about the override process. This silence indicated that many had given up on the efforts 
of their members of Congress to save the industry.  
At the same time that Congress was fighting an uphill battle to pass the 1987 
textile bill, state leaders continued their efforts to repair the economy left behind by the 
textile crisis through economic development, and they continued to focus on the industry 
through a changing textile appreciation week and textile festivals in mill towns. Once a 
member of Congress from South Carolina’s Fourth Congressional District (the area 
surrounding Greenville County), Governor Carroll Campbell, elected to the governorship 
in 1986, became the major player at the state level in 1987, revitalizing the State’s 
Development Board and Department of Commerce to serve his agenda of economic 
development better. Campbell kept the attention of displaced workers and anxious mill 
workers through the positive image he painted for the textile industry to be appreciated – 
which he continued from his predecessor Richard Riley. Together, these two state 
policies became wildly popular at the local level with millhands and citizens, while many 
industry leaders became disgruntled and demonized state leaders for their economic 
development efforts despite their approval of “textile week.”  
Across 1986 and 1987, state and local leaders doubled down their textile 
appreciation efforts, continuing their “Textile Week” campaigns to support the South 
Carolina textile industry and celebrate the workers as heroes of American industry. These 
campaigns, which began in the early-1980s, focused on textile-centric events to recognize 
the textile industry’s impact on South Carolina. However, by 1986, Textile Week in the 
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state began to take on a new tone following the failures at the national level, with textile 
weeks attempting to be a bright spot amidst the dim outlook for the industry. In Laurens 
the 1986 Textile Week was overshadowed by “the frustrating news that the textile 
industry is on the decline” as well as the “disappointment” of the failure of the veto 
override.158 However, local leaders in Laurens, like those in other towns across the state, 
attempted to instead “celebrate those efforts” of the industry, and to “[chart] new 
strategies and [create] new opportunities” within the state.159 In other towns, such as 
Greenwood, Textile Week became a self-examination of the relationship between mill 
and town. To illustrate this, Mat Self of Greenwood Mills claimed during a Textile Week 
event in 1987 that “the problems of the community are also the problems of the textile 
industry,” and that through “partnership,” these challenges could be overcome.”160 Rather 
than being the festive celebration as it was in the early 1980s, Textile Week had become 
a somber recognition of the industry’s ills, along with an attempted celebration of what 
could be a dying or changing industry.  
While the textile appreciation week had taken on a new tone, mill towns across 
the Piedmont began to form “textile festivals” to celebrate the textile industry’s impact on 
those communities. One particular example, the Joanna Textile Festival centered in 
Joanna in south-western Laurens County, became a successful and thriving celebration of 
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the town’s life force. Joanna Textile Days (eventually the Textile Festival) began in April 
1984 as an annual festival to “instill some unity and spirit into the town” that began to 
feel the effects of the industry’s downturn.161 By 1987, the Joanna Textile Festival 
became a successful “tradition over the [previous] four years,” drawing large crowds into 
the cramped mill town with parades, beauty pageants, mill tours, and arts and crafts 
booths.162 The festival’s purpose had shifted from town unity to a promotion of textiles 
and “American-made products” because “textiles are the heartbeat of Joanna” – and 
many other towns who promoted similar festivals.163 Local leaders in Laurens County 
called it an “homage to the textile industry,” and it emerged as a way to celebrate the 
industry in a different way, not just to boost the local economy.164 
As local leaders and mill towns continued to promote Textile Week and create 
textile festivals to celebrate their decaying industry amid the failure of national textile 
trade bills, state leaders redoubled their emphasis on economic development in South 
Carolina to remedy the textile crisis. Attracting new industry, jobs, and capital into the 
state’s economy became one of the main agendas of Governor Campbell – telling a group 
of future investors in 1987 that he hoped that “economic development and progress in 
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South Carolina [would] be the major hallmark” of his administration.165 Campbell began 
actively promoting South Carolina as a place for investment by large corporations, 
especially international companies – especially with Asian nations such as Japan. 
Particularly, Campbell underscored South Carolina’s “pro-business climate,” a “host of 
incentives” for relocation, a “fair and reasonable tax structure,” and more as factors that 
made South Carolina “a great place to live as well as a good place to do business.”166 
Alongside Governor Campbell’s work, the efforts of the State Development 
Board also contributed to the economic development focus of the state government and 
shifting away from a focus on textiles. J. Mac Holladay, then director of the State 
Development Board, announced in 1986 that South Carolina needed to move in a new 
direction, and the state could “no longer rely solely on our manufacturing and industrial 
past.”167 In other words, he and other state official began to believe that textiles were no 
longer the future for the state’s economy. The State Development Board’s efforts 
concentrated on enticing and promoting new industry to call South Carolina home, to 
“promote the state to business decision-makers,” and to promote the state’s “trainable 
workforce.”168 The trainable workforce was a euphemism for the unemployed, unskilled 
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textile labor force, whom many in the state government believed could be retrained into 
other industries to ameliorate the textile crisis. 
However, textile industry leaders reacted negatively to the State Development 
Board and other state officials that promoted economic development and a shift away 
from the textile industry. Many industry officials even branded the state agency as anti-
textile and against the once-largest industry in the state. For example, W. M. “Mat” Self 
of Greenwood Mills claimed that Mac Holladay and that State Development Board 
“question[ed] the worth of the textile industry,” “dismiss[ed] the textile industry,” and 
“question[ed] its importance.”169 Despite the attacks from some textile executives, the 
Development Board maintained that they were “aware of the countless contributions that 
the textile industry has made to our state.”170 However, Director Holladay stated that the 
facts showed that “the industry [had] lost 59,000 jobs in South Carolina” since the mid-
1970s and that “South Carolina’s economic growth in recent years [came] from other 
parts of the manufacturing sector.”171 
 Throughout 1986 and 1987, federal and state leaders took divergent paths to 
acknowledge and assist the textile and apparel industry and their strategies for repairing 
the state’s economy because of the textile crisis of the 1980s. Federal leaders continued 
attempting to pass bills limiting imports they saw as hurting the textile industry with the 
veto override of the 1985 bill and the failed Textile and Apparel Trade Act of 1987. On 
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the other hand, state leaders focused on celebrating and acknowledging the state’s textile 
industry while focusing more heavily on economic development and growing other 
aspects of South Carolina’s industrial sector. These two efforts were met with divergent 
and divisive reactions from textile workers and industry leaders – effectively ending the 
unified textile interest group that so successfully lobbied for the Textile and Apparel 
Trade Enforcement Act of 1985. Textile workers, feeling let down by federal leaders 
continued failures to stem the flow of imports, became more and more disillusioned and 
frustrated with their members of Congress. Meanwhile, industry leaders continued their 
support of federal leaders while becoming angered by state leaders’ economic 
development efforts. Moving into the late 1980s, the continued disillusionment of textile 
workers and national leaders’ failures would lead to largely silence on textile issues by 
1990.  
From Crisis to Status Quo? 
 Following the repeated failures of national leaders to pass a sweeping trade bill 
and the disillusionment of textile workers towards national and state leaders and their 
efforts, silence ensued from federal, local, and industry leaders, mill workers, and citizens 
of textile towns regarding the textile industry starting in 1988. This silence, stemming 
first and foremost from the disillusionment of the workers themselves, was the beginning 
of the unspoken recognition and realization that South Carolina’s textile industry was 
dead on arrival as a result of the textile crisis. Although there was relative silence on the 
textile industry by 1988, several elements and events, including continued economic 
development and new forms of employment opportunities allowed workers to relocated. 
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These constituted forms of unspoken acknowledgment across the state that the fight for 
the textile industry was over.  
 Continuing the previous trend, state leaders and Governor Campbell, in particular,  
increased their emphasis on economic development between 1988 and 1990. In his State 
of the State speech to open the 1988 legislative year in South Carolina, Governor 
Campbell declared that there was “extraordinary success in economic development,” 
mainly through the creation of a “twenty-two year high of more than twenty-two 
thousand new jobs” – all in spite of and without mention of the declining textile 
industry.172 Furthermore, Campbell made “rural and small town development” a priority, 
more than likely to bail out and rescue those areas that lost their primary source of 
income due to the textile crisis – further evidencing the unspoken death of Piedmont 
textiles.173  
 On top of economic development, state leaders increased their focus on workforce 
development, education, and retraining for South Carolina’s industrial workers. This 
policy of workforce education and retraining was supported by Campbell as early as 
1988, where he argued in favor of an “Initiative for Work Force Excellence” to “help 
adult South Carolinians improve…through education” which he argued, “nothing is more 
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important for our people and our state’s long term economic growth.”174 Primarily, these 
efforts would have focused on displaced textile workers, many of whom previously wrote 
to politicians that they have “no other training of education” or would “find it difficult to 
make a living” due to having no education or skills outside of textiles.175 
 Another aspect of the period between 1988 and 1990 in South Carolina regarding 
industry was an acknowledged focus and excitement about new industries and the success 
of statewide economic development – shifting the focus away from the dying textile 
industries to new forms of employment. This excitement about new jobs and economic 
opportunities was especially pronounced in medium-sized cities like Laurens, which had 
the resources to attract new industries and benefitted the most from state economic 
development programs. For example, the first significant industry to enter Laurens 
following the closure of the Laurens Mill was in late-1986 – when Wal-Mart announced 
the construction of a distribution center, and local leaders felt it was the first big step in 
the right direction to revitalize the city and bring jobs to replace the then-hemorrhaging 
textile industry176  
This excitement surrounding the new industry in Laurens was further evidenced 
by a series of articles in the Advertiser profiling the growth of industry and Laurens 
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County while brushing aside the textile industry’s status in the county. The editor of the 
Advertiser wrote in late 1988 that “progress” was a “real process that is all around us,” 
and he argued that the progress the county had made pointed “Laurens County to the 21st 
century in grand fashion.”177 Furthermore, the newspaper listed all of the projects the city 
and county were and would be undergoing throughout the end of the 1980s and the last 
decade of the 20th century. These included “the creation of the McCrory and Wal-Mart 
distribution centers…and the establishment of many, many new businesses.”178 The 
excitement surrounding the future jobs in Laurens without concern or discussion of the 
textile industry and the loss of job surrounding it was further evidenced by the new 
slogan of the Laurens County Chamber of Commerce – “Laurens County: Upcountry, up-
coming” – not declining.179 Between 1988 and 1990, silence from textile workers, 
townsfolk, industry leaders, and state leaders was paired alongside the enthusiasm for 
future industry at the local level and the increased focus on economic development 
statewide. This dual reaction indicated that most people directly connected to or 
surrounding South Carolina’s textile industry either believed it was not worth saving or 
were done dealing with federal officials’ attempts to fix the industry by 1988.  
  Across the second half of the 1980s, the textile crisis continued as it had during 
the beginning of the decade, albeit slightly less intensely as it had between 1984 and 
1985. Due to federal representatives’ continued failure to pass trade legislation to protect 
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the textile industry and the renewed efforts toward economic development from state 
leaders, the reaction and action taken by workers, industry leaders, and townsfolk began 
to diverge from a single textile industry interest group into fragments. Textile workers, 
disgruntled from continually getting their hopes up and being let down by their members 
of Congress, began to become disillusioned with the federal process, and they slowly 
became completely silent regarding their industry by 1988. Similarly, local leaders and 
townsfolk of textile-dominated towns became silent about the textile industry primarily 
because of state and local leaders’ success in attracting new industries to their cities and 
towns.  
National leaders would again push for trade legislation in 1990. However, with 
only the support of industry leaders and without the vocal support of workers and others, 
the bill enjoyed less success than prior ones and ultimately failed yet again. By 1990, the 
silence from those surrounding the textile industry and the continued intense discussion 
around new industry indicated that the once proud and storied textile industry had finally 






 In mid-October 1993, Congressman Butler Derrick composed an editorial 
circulated in the weekly newspapers in his Third Congressional District explaining his 
opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Within it he praised 
the textile worker and then stated, “I fear this agreement would do little other than 
promote the rapid export of US jobs across the border to Mexico…The textile and 
apparel industries have acted as a punching bag for one administration after another.”180 
The response from the textile industry on NAFTA – silence. As the years continued, the 
textile industry’s enemies changed – from East Asia, South Asia, to Mexico and Central 
America. Still, federal leaders like Derrick, who built their careers on textiles, found a 
way to continue to create a scapegoat for the industry that mill workers, industry leaders, 
and local residents already knew had passed away years prior. Derrick soon retired from 
Congress in 1994 to be replaced by an up and coming state representative, Lindsay 
Graham, who was the first Republican to hold South Carolina’s Third Congressional 
District since Reconstruction. The silence from textile workers and local citizens soon 
matched the silence in Washington, as the state finally accepted that its first major 
industry was unsavable.  
 As seen in the previous chapter, silence has shrouded and continues to cover the 
subject of textiles in South Carolina ever since the late-1980s, locally and nationally. 
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After the retirement of Derrick and Senator Fritz Hollings, federal officials turned their 
efforts to other subjects, and state leaders continued their economic development efforts. 
The textile industry continued its steep decline through the early-2000s, leaving behind 
empty mills, ruined fortunes, and ghost towns in its wake. Some cities, like Greenville, 
captured other industries or shift employment to the service sector, some, like Laurens, 
took longer to regain some sense of normalcy, while smaller mill towns like Ware Shoals 
were left to die.  
 This thesis has chronicled the textile industry’s crisis in the late twentieth century 
which was blamed on imports and characterized by mass layoffs and closures which led 
to the loss of tens of thousands of jobs in South Carolina. It has also focused on the 
elaborate, complicated, and evolving relationship between mill workers, industry 
executives, members of Congress, and state and local leaders. Further, this study 
contends that due to these relationships’ ever-changing nature, there were three distinct 
phases of reaction to the textile crisis between 1970 and 1990.  
First, local leaders and workers largely ignored the textile industry’s decline well 
into the late l970s, despite warnings from southern congressmen such as William 
Jennings Bryan Dorn from South Carolina. Second, mill workers, industry leaders, and 
local citizens unified to form an interest group to lobby on behalf of the textile industry to 
secure trade legislation to stop the flow of imports they saw to be so damaging to the 
industry. Third, due to the continued failure of members of Congress and other federal 
leaders to secure trade legislation to alleviate the strain on the textile industry, the once-
unified interest group fragmented by 1988, characterized by the disillusionment of textile 
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workers with national politics. This final chapter argued that textile workers and local 
leaders began to focus on and celebrate the limited success of state leaders in promoting 
economic development and new industries to the state. Furthermore, once the interest 
group fragmented, it led to silence from all parties involved. This, alongside other state 
and local leaders’ actions was an unspoken acknowledgment of the death of the textile 
industry.  
The limited framework of this thesis and the relatively unexplored nature of the 
twilight of the textile industry lead to many questions regarding future research on the 
topic. One further consideration is whether other major textile-producing states – North 
Carolina and Georgia – experienced the same phenomenon as South Carolina regarding 
the decline of their respective textile industries. Did these states’ textile workers, industry 
leaders, and others also react similarly to those in South Carolina? Did their federal 
leaders support trade legislation with the same fervor as those from South Carolina? 
Another direction for future research lies in how different cities were affected by the 
textile crisis and why this was the case. Why was Greenville able to quickly rebound 
from losing its textile mills, while Laurens was slower to recover, and towns like Ware 
Shoals and Honea Path were never able to rebound at all? Lastly, further research is 
necessary to study migration patterns within South Carolina and the Piedmont South due 
to the closure of textile mills and mass layoffs. It can be seen that due to the closure of 
mills, people left their traditional homes in textile mill villages – leaving the town to die – 
but where did they go? For what forms of employment were they moving? What was 
their reasoning for moving? 
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Although the mid-to-late twentieth century in the American South is traditionally 
characterized by the rise of the Sunbelt South – a prosperous, urban-centered picture of 
the South that began to outpace the North economically – there was an industrial decline 
occurring in the Piedmont South’s textile industry that parallels the deindustrialization 
that was occurring in Northern cities. This time of industrial decline was a period that 
demonstrates the political activism of mill workers, industry leaders, and townsfolk late 
into the twentieth century through their reactions to the textile crisis threatening their 
livelihoods. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, these same groups silently acknowledged 
their industry had no hope left – leaving it to continue its slow death. Industrial decline in 
South Carolina’s textile industry also illustrated that to many textile workers, industry 
leaders, and local citizens, the closure of their textile mill was indeed “like a death in the 
family” through the devastation of local economies, desertion of entire towns, and 
personal feelings of loss toward a life they had always known.  
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